Stumpf, K., ’Ueber d.
psycholog. Ursprung d.
Raumvorstellung,’ Leipzig, 1873, S. 54.
 Bain, A., ‘The Senses
and the Intellect,’ 3d ed., New
York, 1886, p. 183.
Stumpf maintained in his exhaustive criticism of this theory, first, that there are cases where all of the elements which Bain requires for the perception of space are present, and yet we have no presentation of space. Secondly, there are cases where not all of these elements are present, and where we have nevertheless space presentation. It is the first objection that concerns me here. Stumpf gives as an example, under his first objection, the singing of a series of tones, C, G, E, F. We have here the muscle sensations from the larynx, and the series of the tone-sensations which are, Stumpf claims, reversed when the muscle-sensations are reversed, etc. According to Stumpf, these are all the elements that are required by Bain, and yet we have no perception of space thereby. Henri has pointed out two objections to Stumpf’s criticism of Bain’s theory. He says that Bain assumes, what Stumpf does not recognize, that the muscle sensations must contain three elements—resistance, time, and velocity—before they can lead to space perceptions. These three elements are not to be found in the muscle sensations of the larynx as we find them in the sensations that come from the eye or arm muscles. In addition to this, Henri claims that Bain’s theory demands a still further condition. If we wish to touch two objects, A and B, with the same member, we can get a spatial experience from the process only if we insert between the touching of A and the touching of B a continual series of tactual sensations. In Stumpf’s instance of the singing of tones, this has been overlooked. We can go from the tone C to the tone F without inserting between the two a continuous series of musical sensations.