We say that the voluntaristic theory, the interpretation of our real attitudes, in short teleological knowledge, alone can account for the value and right of phenomenalistic psychology and it thus seems unfair to raise the objection of ‘double bookkeeping.’  These two aspects of inner life are not ultimately independent and exclusive; the subjective purposes of real life necessarily demand the labors of objectivistic psychology.  The last word is thus not dualistic but monistic and the two truths supplement each other.  But this supplementation must never be misinterpreted as meaning that the two sciences divide inner experience, as if, for instance, the phenomenalistic study dealt with perceptions and ideas, the voluntaristic with feelings and volitions.  No, it is really a difference of logical purpose of treatment and thus a difference of points of view only; the whole experience without exception must be possible material for both.  There is no feeling and no volition which is not for the phenomenalist a content of consciousness and nothing else.  There is, on the other hand, no perception and no idea which is not, or better, ought not to be for the voluntarist a means, an aim, a tool, an end, an ideal.  In that real life experience of which the voluntarist is speaking, every object is the object of will and those real objects have not been differentiated into physical things under the abstract categories of mechanics on the one hand, and psychical ideas of them in consciousness on the other; the voluntarist, if he is consistent, knows neither physical nor psychical phenomena.  Phenomenalist and voluntarist thus do not see anything under the same aspect, neither the ideas nor the will.

This difference is wrongly set forth if the antithesis to voluntarism is called intellectualism.  Intellectualism is based on the category of judgment, and judgment too is a ideological attitude.  Phenomenalism does not presuppose a subject which knows its contents but a subject which simply has its contents; the consciousness which has the thought as content does not take through that the voluntaristic attitude of knowing it and the psychologist has therefore no reason to prefer the thought to the volition and thus to play the intellectualist.  If the psychologist does emphasize the idea and its elements, the sensations, it is not because they are vehicles of thought but because their relations to physical objects make them vehicles of communication.  The elements of ideas are negotiable and thus through their reference to the common physical world indirectly describable; as the elements of ideas are alone in this position, the psychologist is obliged to consider all contents of consciousness, ideas and volitions alike, as complexes of sensations.