The art of fixing a camp in modern times is the same as taking up a line of battle on the same position.  Of all the projectile machines must be in play and favorably placed.  The position must neither be commanded, out-fronted, nor surrounded; but on the contrary ought, as far as possible, to command and out-front the enemy’s position.  But even in the same position there are numerous modes of arranging an encampment, or of forming a line of battle, and to select the best of these modes requires great experience, coup d’oeil, and genius.  In relation to this point Napoleon makes the following remarks:—­

“Ought an army to be confined to one single encampment, or ought it to form as many as it has corps or divisions?  At what distance ought the vanguard and the flankers to be encamped?  What frontage and what depth ought to be given to the camp?  Where should the cavalry, the artillery, and the carriages be distributed?  Should the army be ranged in battle array, in several lines?  And if it should, what space should there be between those lines?  Should the cavalry be in reserve behind the infantry, or should it be placed upon the wings?  As every piece has sufficient ammunition for keeping up its fire twenty-four hours, should all the artillery be brought into action at the beginning of the engagement, or should half of it be kept in reserve?”

“The solution of these questions depends on the following circumstances:—­1st.  On the number of troops, and the numbers of infantry, artillery, and cavalry, of which the army is composed. 2d.  On the relation subsisting between the two armies. 3d.  On the quality of the troops. 4th.  On the end in view. 5th.  On the nature of the field.  And 6th.  On the position occupied by the enemy, and on the character of the general who commands them.  Nothing absolute either can or ought to be prescribed on this head.  In modern warfare there is no natural order of battle.”

“The duty to be performed by the commander of an army is more difficult in modern armies, than it was in those of the ancients.  It is also certain that his influence is more efficacious in deciding battles.  In the ancient armies the general-in-chief, at a distance of eighty or a hundred toises from the enemy, was in no danger; and yet he was conveniently placed, so as to have an opportunity of directing to advantage all the movements of his forces.  In modern armies, a general-in-chief, though removed four or five hundred toises, finds himself in the midst of the fire of the enemy’s batteries, and is very much exposed; and still he is so distant that several movements of the enemy escape him.  In every engagement he is occasionally obliged to approach within reach of small-arms.  The effect of modern arms is much influenced by the situation in which they are placed.  A battery of guns, with a great range and a commanding position that takes the enemy obliquely, may be decisive of a victory.  Modern fields of battle are much more extended than those of the ancients, whence it becomes necessary to study operations on a large scale.  A much greater degree of experience and military genius is requisite for the direction of a modern army than was necessary for an ancient one.”