The questions evolved by the war are already attracting public attention.  It is well that they should do so.  The peace and prosperity of the country in future years depend upon their solution.  They are so interwoven that a mistake in regard to one may involve us in other errors.  The power of the Government so to remove the cause of the present rebellion as to prevent its recurrence, if it have any such power, is one which it is imperatively bound to exercise,—­else all the treasure and blood expended in quelling it will be wasted.  Has it any such power?  Can Slavery be exterminated?  And can the Rebel States be held as conquests, and be restored only upon condition of being forever free?  It is proposed briefly to discuss these questions.

EMANCIPATION.

There are those who believe that the President’s Proclamation will cease to be of any force at the close of the war, and that no slaves will have any right to their freedom by it except such as may be actually liberated by the military authorities.

There are others, who hold that the Proclamation has the force of law,—­that by it every slave within the designated territory has now a legal right to his liberty,—­and that, if the military power does not secure that right to him during the war, he may successfully appeal to the civil power afterwards.

If the Proclamation is a law, it must be conceded, that, like all the laws of war, it will cease to be in force when the war is closed.  But if, like a legislative act, it confers actual rights on the slaves, whether they are able to secure them in fact or not, then those rights are not lost, though the law cease to exist.  On the other hand, if it confers no actual rights on any who are beyond its reach,—­if it is merely an offer of freedom to all who can come and receive it,—­then those only who do receive it while the offer continues will have any rights by it when it has ceased to be in force.

The position of Mr. Adams on this subject seems to have been misunderstood.  When his remarks in Congress are carefully examined, it will be found that he did not claim that the proclamation of a military commander would operate, like a statute, to confer the right of freedom upon all the slaves in an invaded country.  But he asserted a general principle of international law,—­that the commander of an invading army is not bound to recognize the municipal laws of the country,—­that he may treat all as freemen, though some are slaves.  And he claimed, that, in case of a servile war in this country, our army would have a right to suppress the insurrection by giving freedom to the insurgents.  In regard to the effect of such a proclamation upon those not liberated by the military power, he expressed no opinion.

The precedents usually cited are not any more satisfactory.  In Hayti, and in the South-American republics, emancipation became an established fact by the action of the civil power.  In each case a proclamation by the military power was the initial step; but the consummation was attained by the fact that the same power afterwards became dominant in civil, as well as in military affairs.