Essays on Political Economy eBook

Frédéric Bastiat
This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 213 pages of information about Essays on Political Economy.

Essays on Political Economy eBook

Frédéric Bastiat
This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 213 pages of information about Essays on Political Economy.

III.—­Taxes.

Have you never chanced to hear it said:  “There is no better investment than taxes.  Only see what a number of families it maintains, and consider how it reacts upon industry:  it is an inexhaustible stream, it is life itself.”

In order to combat this doctrine, I must refer to my preceding refutation.  Political economy knew well enough that its arguments were not so amusing that it could be said of them, repetitions please.  It has, therefore, turned the proverb to its own use, well convinced that, in its mouth, repetitions teach.

The advantages which officials advocate are those which are seen.  The benefit which accrues to the providers is still that which is seen.  This blinds all eyes.

But the disadvantages which the tax-payers have to get rid of are those which are not seen.  And the injury which results from it to the providers is still that which is not seen, although this ought to be self-evident.

When an official spends for his own profit an extra hundred sous, it implies that a tax-payer spends for his profit a hundred sous less.  But the expense of the official is seen, because the act is performed, while that of the tax-payer is not seen, because, alas! he is prevented from performing it.

You compare the nation, perhaps to a parched tract of land, and the tax to a fertilising rain.  Be it so.  But you ought also to ask yourself where are the sources of this rain, and whether it is not the tax itself which draws away the moisture from the ground and dries it up?

Again, you ought to ask yourself whether it is possible that the soil can receive as much of this precious water by rain as it loses by evaporation?

There is one thing very certain, that when James B. counts out a hundred sous for the tax-gatherer, he receives nothing in return.  Afterwards, when an official spends these hundred sous, and returns them to James B., it is for an equal value in corn or labour.  The final result is a loss to James B. of five francs.

It is very true that often, perhaps very often, the official performs for James B. an equivalent service.  In this case there is no loss on either side; there is merely an exchange.  Therefore, my arguments do not at all apply to useful functionaries.  All I say is,—­if you wish to create an office, prove its utility.  Show that its value to James B., by the services which it performs for him, is equal to what it costs him.  But, apart from this intrinsic utility, do not bring forward as an argument the benefit which it confers upon the official, his family, and his providers; do not assert that it encourages labour.

When James B. gives a hundred sous to a Government officer for a really useful service, it is exactly the same as when he gives a hundred sous to a shoemaker for a pair of shoes.

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Essays on Political Economy from Project Gutenberg. Public domain.