His theory of knowledge he had derived eclectically and somewhat eccentrically, from Lotze and Kant.  To this day not all, either of his friends or foes, are quite certain what it was.  It is open to doubt whether Ritschl really arrived at his theory of cognition and then made it one of the bases of his theology.  It is conceivable that he made his theology and then propounded his theory of cognition in its defence.  In a word, the basis of distinction between religious and scientific knowledge is not to be sought in its object.  It is to be found in the sphere of the subject, in the difference of attitude of the subject toward the object.  Religion is concerned with what he calls Werthurtheile, judgments of value, considerations of our relation to the world, which are of moment solely in accordance with their value in awakening feelings of pleasure or of pain.  The thought of God, for example, must be treated solely as a judgment of value.  It is a conception which is of worth for the attainment of good, for our spiritual peace and victory over the world.  What God is in himself we cannot know, an existential Judgment we cannot form without going over to the metaphysicians.  What God is to us we can know simply as religious men and solely upon the basis of religious experience.  God is holy love.  That is a religious value-judgment.  But what sort of a being God must be in order that we may assign to him these attributes, we cannot say without leaving the basis of experience.  This is pragmatism indeed.  It opens up boundless possibilities of subjectivism in a man who was apparently only too matter-of-fact.

There was a time in his career when Ritschl was popular with both conservatives and liberals.  There were long years in which he was bitterly denounced by both.  Yet there was something in the man and in his teaching which went beyond all the antagonisms of the schools.  There can be no doubt that it was the intention of Ritschl to build his theology solely upon the gospel of Jesus Christ.  The joy and confidence with which this theology could be preached, Ritschl awakened in his pupils in a degree which had not been equalled by any theologian since Schleiermacher himself.  Numbers who, in the time of philosophical and scientific uncertainty, had lost their courage, regained it in contact with his confident and deeply religious spirit.  A wholesome nature, eminently objective in temper, concentrated with all his force upon his task, of rare dialectical gifts, he had a great sense of humour and occasionally also the faculty of bitterly sarcastic speech.  His very figure radiated the delight of conflict as he walked the Goettingen wall.