Nature, as science regards it, may be described as a system whose parts, be they simple or complex, are wholly governed by universal laws.  Knowledge of these laws is an indispensable condition of that control of nature upon which human welfare in so large degree depends.  But this reign of law is an hypothesis.  It is not an axiom which it would be absurd to deny.  It is not an obvious fact, thrust upon us whether we will or no.  Experiences are possible without the conception of law and order.  The fruit of experience in knowledge is not possible without it.  That is only to say that the reason why we assume that nature is a connected system of uniform laws, lies in the fact that we ourselves are self-conscious personalities.  When the naturalists say that the notion of cause is a fetish, an anthropomorphic superstition which we must eliminate, we have to answer:  ’from the realm of empirical science perhaps, but not from experience as a whole.’  Indeed, a glance at the history, and particularly at the popular literature, of science affords the interesting spectacle of the rise of an hallucination, the growth of a habit of mythological speech, which is truly surprising.  We begin to hear of self-existent laws which reign supreme and bind nature fast in fact.  By this learned substitution for God, it was once confidently assumed that the race was to emerge from mythical dawn and metaphysical shadows into the noon-day of positive knowledge.  Rather, it would appear that at this point a part of the human race plunged into a new era of myth-making and fetish worship—­the homage to the fetish of law.  Even the great minds do not altogether escape.  ‘Fact I know and law I know,’ says Huxley, with a faint suggestion of sacred rhetoric.  But surely we do not know law in the same sense in which we know fact.  If there are no causes among our facts, then we do not know anything about the laws.  If we do know laws it is because we assume causes.  If, in the language of rational beings, laws of nature are to be spoken of as self-existent and independent of the phenomena which they are said to govern, such language must be merely analogous to the manner in which we often speak of the civil law.  We say the law does that which we know the executive does.  But the thorough-going naturalist cast off these implications as the last rags of a creed outworn.  Physicists were fond of talking of the movement of molecules, just as the ancient astrologers imagined that the planets had souls and guided their own courses.  We had supposed that this was anthropomorphism.  In truth, this would-be scientific mode of speech is as anthropomorphic as is the cosmogony of Hesiod, only on a smaller scale.  Primitive religion ascribed life to everything of which it talked.  Polytheism in religion and independent forces and self-existent laws in science are thus upon a par.  The gods many and lords many, so amenable to concrete presentation in poetry and art, have given place to one Supreme Being.  So also