CHAP. 15.
Of those things in respect whereof men, and especially
Princes are prais’d or disprais’d, 313
CHAP. 16.
Of Liberality and Miserableness, 315
CHAP. 17.
Of Cruelty and Clemency, and whether it is better
to be belov’d or feared, 318
CHAP. 18.
In what manner Princes ought to keep their word, 321
CHAP. 19.
That Princes should take a care not to incur contempt
or hatred, 325
CHAP. 20.
Whether the Citadels and many other things, which
Princes make use of, are profitable or dammageable,
335
CHAP. 21.
How a Prince ought to behave himself to gain reputation,
339
CHAP. 22.
Touching Princes Secretaries, 343
CHAP. 23.
That Flatterers are to be avoyded, 344
CHAP. 24.
Wherefore the Princes of Italy have lost their States,
347
CHAP. 25.
How great power Fortune hath in humane affairs, and
what means there is to resist it, 349
CHAP. 26.
An exhortation to free Italy from the Barbarions,
353
Written by
NICHOLAS MACHIAVELLI,
Secretary and Citizen of Florence.
How many sorts of Principalities there are, and how
many wayes they are attained to.
All States, all Dominions that have had, or now have
rule over men, have been and are, either Republiques
or Principalities. Principalities are either
hereditary, whereof they of the blood of the Lord thereof
have long time been Princes; or else they are new;
and those that are new, are either all new, as was
the Dutchy of Millan to Francis Sforce; or are as
members adjoyned to the hereditary State of the Prince
that gains it; as the Kingdom of Naples is to the
King of Spain. These Dominions so gotten, are
accustomed either to live under a Prince, or to enjoy
their liberty; and are made conquest of, either with
others forces, or ones own, either by fortune, or
by valor.
Of Hereditary Principalities.
I will not here discourse of Republiques, because
I have other where treated of them at large:
I will apply my self only to a Principality, and proceed,
while I weave this web, by arguing thereupon, how these
Principallities can be governed and maintained.
I say then that in States of inheritance, and accustomed
to the blood of their Princes, there are far fewer
difficulties to keep them, than in the new: for
it suffices only not to transgress the course his
Ancestors took, and so afterward to temporise with
those accidents that can happen; that if such a Prince
be but of ordinary industry, he shall allwaies be able
to maintain himself in his State, unless by some extraordinary
