more demonstrable than that there should be in every republic, some permanent body to correct the prejudices, check the intemperate passions, and regulate the fluctuations of a popular assembly.  It is evident, that a body instituted for these purposes, must be so formed as to exclude as much as possible from its own character, those infirmities and that mutability which it is designed to remedy.  It is therefore necessary that it should be small, that it should hold its authority during a considerable period, and that it should have such an independence in the exercise of its powers, as will divest it as much as possible of local prejudices.  It should be so formed as to be the centre of political knowledge, to pursue always a steady line of conduct, and to reduce every irregular propensity to system.  Without this establishment, we may make experiments without end, but shall never have an efficient government.

It is an unquestionable truth, that the body of the people in every country desire sincerely its prosperity; but it is equally unquestionable, that they do not possess the discernment and stability necessary for systematic government.  To deny that they are frequently led into the grossest errors by misinformation and passion, would be a flattery which their own good sense must despise.  That branch of administration especially, which involves our political relations with foreign states, a community will ever be incompetent to.  These truths are not often held up in public assemblies:  but they cannot be unknown to any who hear me.  From these principles it follows, that there ought to be two distinct bodies in our government:  one, which shall be immediately constituted by and peculiarly represent the people, and possess all the popular features; another, formed upon the principle, and for the purposes, before explained.  Such considerations as these induced the convention who formed your State constitution, to institute a Senate upon the present plan.  The history of ancient and modern republics had taught them, that many of the evils which these republics had suffered, arose from the want of a certain balance and mutual control indispensable to a wise administration; they were convinced that popular assemblies are frequently misguided by ignorance, by sudden impulses, and the intrigues of ambitious men; and that some firm barrier against these operations was necessary; they, therefore, instituted your Senate, and the benefits we have experienced have fully justified their conceptions.

Gentlemen, in their reasoning, have placed the interests of the several States, and those of the United States in contrast; this is not a fair view of the subject; they must necessarily be involved in each other.  What we apprehend is, that some sinister prejudice, or some prevailing passion, may assume the form of a genuine interest.  The influence of these is as powerful as the most permanent conviction of the public good; and against this influence we ought to