is so colored by sentiment that it may well happen that two shall agree on the thing, and fight to the death about the word.  We need the support of such reflections when we recall the history of such a word as “pleasure.”  To pursue pleasure, say the anti-utilitarians, is a swinish doctrine.  “Yes,” replied Mr. Mill, “if men were swine, and capable only of the pleasures appropriate to that species of animals.”  Those who could not answer this argument, and at the same time cannot divest themselves of the association of pleasure with the ignoble, took refuge in the charge of inconsistency, and, finding there was not less but more nobility in Mr. Mill’s writing than their own theory, accused him of abandoning the tradition of his school.  Mahomet would not go to the mountain, and they pleased themselves with the thought that the mountain had gone to Mahomet.  Such a charge is really tantamount to a confession that popular antipathy was more easily excited by the word than by the real doctrine.  Nevertheless Mr. Mill did an incalculable service in showing not less by his whole life, than by his writings, that utilitarianism takes account of all that is good in man’s nature, and includes the highest emotions, as well as those that are more commonplace.  He took away a certain reproach of narrowness, which was never in the doctrine, and which was loudly, though perhaps with little reason, urged against some of its most conspicuous supporters.  An important addition to the theory of morals is also contained in the book on “Utilitarianism.”  His analysis of “justice” is one of the happiest efforts of inductive definition to be found in any book on ethics.  From any point of view, it must be regarded as a valuable addition to the literature of ethical philosophy.

The somewhat technical subject of jurisprudence was not too much for Mr. Mill’s immense power of assimilation.  One of his earliest efforts was as editor of Bentham’s “Rationale of Judicial Evidence.”  He must, therefore, at an early period, have been master of the most original and enlightened theory of judicial evidence that the world has seen.  He lived to see nearly all the important innovations proposed by Bentham become part and parcel of the law of the land; one of the last relics of bigotry—­the exclusion of honest atheists (and only of such) from the witness-box—­having been removed two or three years ago.  Mr. Mill, in after years, attended Austin’s famous lectures on jurisprudence, taking extensive notes; so that he was able to supply the matter wanting to complete two important lectures, as they were printed in the first edition of Austin’s works.  Among the “Dissertations and Discussions,” is a criticism of Austin’s work, which shows that he was far more than a scholar,—­a most competent judge of his master.  He pointed out in Austin’s definition of “right” a real defect.  One of the points that Austin elaborated most was a classification such as might serve for a scientific code of law.  Mr. Mill fully acknowledged the merits of the scheme, but laid his finger unerringly on its weakest part.  His remarks show, that, if he had followed up the subject with an adequate knowledge of any good system of law, he would have rivalled or surpassed his achievements in other departments of knowledge.