not to neglect of military counsels, but to the adoption of such counsels, contrary to the more far-seeing judgment of the civil side.”  That is a condemnation of the civilian Minister and of the Cabinet, for no man in charge of the Nation’s affairs ought to take the responsibility for a decision of the soundness of which he is not convinced.  If Lord Lansdowne disagreed with Lord Wolseley and was not prepared to ask for that officer’s retirement, why did he not himself retire rather than make himself responsible for measures which he thought wrong or mistaken?  These are not personal criticisms or attacks.  Lord Wolseley and Lord Lansdowne have both of them in the past rendered splendid services to the Nation.  But the Empire is at stake, and a writer’s duty is to set forth and apply the principles which he believes to be sound, without being a respecter of persons yet with that respect for every man, especially for every public man, which is the best tradition of our National life.  What at the present moment ought not to be tolerated is what Lord Ernest Hamilton suggests, an attack upon the generals at the front, to save the War Office or the Cabinet; and what is needed is that the Ministers should choose a war adviser who can convince them, even though to find him they have to pass over a hundred generals and select a colonel, a captain, or a crammer.

THE STRATEGY OF THE WAR

January 11th, 1900

The arrival of Lord Roberts at Cape Town announces the approaching beginning of a new chapter in the war, though the second chapter is not yet quite finished.

The first chapter was the campaign of Sir George White with sixteen thousand men against the principal Boer army.  It ended with Sir George White’s being surrounded in Ladysmith and there locked up.

The second chapter began with the arrival of.  Sir Redvers Buller at Cape Town.  It may be reviewed under two headings:  the conception and the execution of the operations.  When Sir Redvers Buller reached the Cape, the force which he was expecting, and of which he had the control, consisted altogether of nearly sixty thousand regular troops, besides Cape and colonial troops.  There was an Army Corps, thirty-five thousand, a cavalry division, five thousand, troops for the defence of communications, ten thousand, and troops at the Cape amounting to eight thousand, some of whom were at Mafeking and Kimberley.  After deducting fourteen thousand men for communications and garrisons at the Cape, the commander had at his disposal for use in the field about forty-four thousand regular troops arranged as a cavalry brigade, seven brigades of infantry, and corps troops.