It may be taken as a general rule that no question of major strategy can be decided apart from diplomacy, and vice versa.  For a line of action or an object which is expedient from the point of view of strategy may be barred by diplomatic considerations, and vice versa.  To decide a question of Major Strategy, without consideration of its diplomatic aspect, is to decide on half the factors only.  Neither strategy or diplomacy has ever a clean slate.  This inter-action has to be accepted as part of the inevitable “friction of war.”  A good example is Pitt’s refusal to send a fleet into the Baltic to assist Frederick the Great during the Seven Years’ War, for fear of compromising our relations with the Scandinavian Powers.

Minor Strategy has for its province the plans of operations.  It deals with—­

    (1) The selection of the “objectives,” that is, the particular forces
    of the enemy or the strategical points to be dealt with in order to
    secure the object of the particular operation.

    (2) The direction of the force assigned for the operation.

Minor Strategy may, therefore, be of three kinds:—­

    (1) Naval, where the immediate object is to be attained by a fleet
    only.

    (2) Military, where the immediate object is to be attained by an army
    only.

    (3) Combined, where the immediate object is to be attained by army and
    navy together.

It will be seen, therefore, that what is usually called Naval Strategy or Fleet Strategy is only a sub-division of Strategy, and that therefore Strategy cannot be studied from the point of view of naval operations only.  Naval Strategy, being a part of General Strategy, is subject to the same friction as Major Strategy, though in a less degree.  Individual commanders have often to take a decision independently of the central government or headquarters; they should, therefore, always keep in mind the possible ulterior effects of any line of action they may take, endeavouring to be sure that what is strategically expedient is not diplomatically inexpedient.

Example.—­For example, take Boscawen’s attack on De la Motte on the eve of the Seven Years’ War in 1755.  His orders were to prevent the troops and warlike stores which De la Motte was taking out from reaching Canada.  It was not diplomatically expedient to open hostilities; but if Boscawen succeeded, the result would have been worth the diplomatic consequences it would entail.  He missed the expedition, but captured two isolated vessels; thus striking the first blow in such a way as to entail the utmost amount of harm with the least possible good.

OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE

Nature of Object

Upon the nature of the object depends the fundamental distinction between offensive and defensive, upon which all strategical calculation must be based.  Consequently, the solution of every strategical problem, whether of Major or Minor Strategy, depends primarily on the nature of the object in view.