will believe also, that nothing but a firm combination of public men against this body, and that, too, supported by the hearty concurrence of the people at large, can possibly get the better of it.  The people will see the necessity of restoring public men to an attention to the public opinion, and of restoring the constitution to its original principles.  Above all, they will endeavor to keep the House of Commons from assuming a character which does not belong to it.  They will endeavor to keep that House, for its existence, for its powers, and its privileges, as independent of every other, and as dependent upon themselves, as possible.  This servitude is to a House of Commons (like obedience to the Divine law) “perfect freedom.”  For if they once quit this natural, rational, and liberal obedience, having deserted the only proper foundation of their power, they must seek a support in an abject and unnatural dependence somewhere else.  When, through the medium of this just connection with their constituents, the genuine dignity of the House of Commons is restored, it will begin to think of casting from it, with scorn, as badges of servility, all the false ornaments of illegal power, with which it has been, for some time, disgraced.  It will begin to think of its old office of CONTROL.  It will not suffer that last of evils to predominate in the country:  men without popular confidence, public opinion, natural connection, or mutual trust, invested with all the powers of government.

When they have learned this lesson themselves, they will be willing and able to teach the court, that it is the true interest of the prince to have but one administration; and that one composed of those who recommend themselves to their sovereign through the opinion of their country, and not by their obsequiousness to a favorite.  Such men will serve their sovereign with affection and fidelity; because his choice of them, upon such principles, is a compliment to their virtue.  They will be able to serve him effectually; because they will add the weight of the country to the force of the executory power.  They will be able to serve their king with dignity; because they will never abuse his name to the gratification of their private spleen or avarice.  This, with allowances for human frailty, may probably be the general character of a ministry, which thinks itself accountable to the House of Commons; when the House of Commons thinks itself accountable to its constituents.  If other ideas should prevail, things must remain in their present confusion, until they are hurried into all the rage of civil violence, or until they sink into the dead repose of despotism.

END OF VOL.  I.

FOOTNOTES: 

[102] Mem. de Sully, tom. i. p. 133.

[103] “Uxor Hugonis de Nevill dat Domino Regi ducentas Gallinas, eo quod possit jacere una nocte cum Domino suo Hugone de Nevill.”—­Maddox, Hist.  Exch. c. xiii. p. 326.