mean lie, the mean silence, the calumnious truth, the backbiter, the petty tyrant, the peevish poisoner of family life—­their standard is quite different.  These are wrong, they will admit, yet somehow not so wrong; there is no zeal in their assault on them, no secret element of gusto warms up the sermon; it is for things not wrong in themselves that they reserve the choicest of their indignation.  A man may naturally disclaim all moral kinship with the Reverend Mr. Zola or the hobgoblin old lady of the dolls; for these are gross and naked instances.  And yet in each of us some similar element resides.  The sight of a pleasure in which we cannot or else will not share moves us to a particular impatience.  It may be because we are envious, or because we are sad, or because we dislike noise and romping—­being so refined, or because—­being so philosophic—­we have an overweighing sense of life’s gravity:  at least, as we go on in years, we are all tempted to frown upon our neighbour’s pleasures.  People are nowadays so fond of resisting temptations; here is one to be resisted.  They are fond of self-denial; here is a propensity that cannot be too peremptorily denied.  There is an idea abroad among moral people that they should make their neighbours good.  One person I have to make good:  myself.  But my duty to my neighbour is much more nearly expressed by saying that I have to make him happy—­if I may.

III

Happiness and goodness, according to canting moralists, stand in the relation of effect and cause.  There was never anything less proved or less probable:  our happiness is never in our own hands; we inherit our constitution; we stand buffet among friends and enemies; we may be so built as to feel a sneer or an aspersion with unusual keenness, and so circumstanced as to be unusually exposed to them; we may have nerves very sensitive to pain, and be afflicted with a disease very painful.  Virtue will not help us, and it is not meant to help us.  It is not even its own reward, except for the self-centred and—­I had almost said—­the unamiable.  No man can pacify his conscience; if quiet be what he want, he shall do better to let that organ perish from disuse.  And to avoid the penalties of the law, and the minor capitis diminutio of social ostracism, is an affair of wisdom—­of cunning, if you will—­and not of virtue.

In his own life, then, a man is not to expect happiness, only to profit by it gladly when it shall arise; he is on duty here; he knows not how or why, and does not need to know; he knows not for what hire, and must not ask.  Somehow or other, though he does not know what goodness is, he must try to be good; somehow or other, though he cannot tell what will do it, he must try to give happiness to others.  And no doubt there comes in here a frequent clash of duties.  How far is he to make his neighbour happy?  How far must he respect that smiling face, so easy to cloud, so hard to brighten again?  And how far, on the other side, is he bound to be his brother’s keeper and the prophet of his own morality?  How far must he resent evil?