a corresponding individual improvement on the part of its constituent members.  There is similarly no way in which a permanently satisfactory system of international relations can be secured, save by the increasing historical experience and effective self-control of related nations.  Any country which declares that it is too good (or too democratic) to associate with other nations and share the responsibilities and opportunities resulting from such association is comparable to the individual who declares himself to be too saintly for association with his fellow-countrymen.  Whatever a man or a nation gains by isolation, he or it necessarily loses in the discipline of experience with its possible fruits of wisdom and self-control.  Association is a condition of individuality.  International relations are a condition of nationality.  A universal nation is as much a contradiction in terms as a universal individual.  A nation seeking to destroy other nations is analogous to a man who seeks to destroy the society in which he was born.  Little by little European history has been teaching this lesson; and in the course of time the correlation of national development with the improvement and definition of international relations will probably be embodied in some set of international institutions.

In the meantime the existing rivalries and enmities among European states must not be under-estimated either in their significance or their strength.  In a way those rivalries have become more intense than ever before; and it is only too apparent that the many-headed rulers of modern nations are as capable of cherishing personal and national dislikes as were the sovereign kings of other centuries.  These rivalries and enmities will not be dissolved by kind words and noble sentiments.  The federation of Europe, like the unification of Germany, will never be brought about by congresses and amicable resolutions.  It can be effected only by the same old means of blood and iron.  The nations will never agree upon a permanent settlement until they have more to gain from peace than from military victory.  But such a time will be postponed all the longer unless the nations, like France, Italy, England and the United States, which are at present sincerely desirous of peace, keep as well armed as their more belligerent neighbors.  When the tug comes, the issue will depend upon the effective force which such nations, when loyally combined, can exert.  It would be fatal, consequently, for the pacific Powers to seek to establish peace by a partial diminution of their military efficiency.  Such an action would merely encourage the belligerent Powers to push their aggressive plans to the limit.  The former must, on the contrary, keep as well armed as their resources and policy demand.  Nationality is impaired and the national principle is violated just as soon as a nation neglects any sort of efficiency which is required either by its international position or by its national purposes.