of events succeeding it so as to be able to decide upon a policy towards China and determine the action to be ultimately taken.  If we remain passive, the Imperial Japanese Government’s policy towards China will lose that subjective influence and our diplomacy will be checked for ever by the combined force of the other Powers.  The peace of the Far East will be thus endangered and even the existence of the Japanese Empire as a nation will no doubt be imperilled.  It is therefore our first important duty at this moment to enquire of our Government what course is to be adopted to face that general situation after the war?  What preparations are being made to meet the combined pressure of the Allies upon China?  What policy has been followed to solve the Chinese Question?  When the European War is terminated and peace restored we are not concerned so much with the question whether it be the Dual Monarchies or the Triple Entente which emerge victorious but whether, in anticipation of the future expansion of European influence in the Continents of Europe and Asia, the Imperial Japanese Government should or should not hesitate to employ force to check the movement before this occurrence.  Now is the most opportune moment for Japan to quickly solve the Chinese Question.  Such an opportunity will not occur for hundreds of years to come.  Not only is it Japan’s divine duty to act now, but present conditions in China favour the execution of such a plan.  We should by all means decide and act at once.  If our authorities do not avail themselves of this rare opportunity, great difficulty will surely be encountered in future in the settlement of this Chinese Question.  Japan will be isolated from the European Powers after the war, and will be regarded by them with envy and jealousy just as Germany is now regarded.  Is it not then a vital necessity for Japan to solve at this very moment the Chinese Question?

No one—­not even those who care nothing for politics—­can deny that there is in this document an astounding disclosure of the mental attitude of the Japanese not only towards their enemies but towards their friends as well.  They trust nobody, befriend nobody, envy nobody; they content themselves with believing that the whole world may in the not distant future turn against them.  The burden of their argument swings just as much against their British ally as against Germany and Austria; and the one and only matter which preoccupies Japanese who make it their business to think about such things is to secure that Japan shall forestall Europe in seizing control of China.  It is admitted in so many words that it is too early to know who is to triumph in the gigantic European struggle; it is also admitted that Germany will forever be the enemy.  At the same time it is expected, should the issue of the struggle be clear-cut and decisive in favour of the Allies, that a new three-Power combination formed by England, France and Russia may be made to operate