made among them in the years that lay ahead seemed to add intensity to their demonstrations of personal devotion.  The most dramatic moment at Balmoral—­if for once the word so hackneyed and misused by journalists may be given its true signification—­the most dramatic moment was when the Ulster leader and the leader of the whole Unionist Party each grasped the other’s hand in view of the assembled multitude, as though formally ratifying a compact made thus publicly on the eve of battle.  It was the consummation of the purpose of this assembly of the Unionist hosts on Ulster soil, and gave assurance of unity of aim and undivided command in the coming struggle.

Of the other speeches delivered, many of them of a high quality, especially, perhaps, those of Lord Hugh Cecil, Sir Robert Finlay, and Mr. Scott Dickson, it is enough to say that they all conveyed the same message of encouragement to Ulster, the same promise of undeviating support.  One detail, however, deserves mention, because it shows the direction in which men’s thoughts were then moving.  Mr. Walter Long, whose great services to the cause of the Union procured him a welcome second in warmth to that of no other leader, after thanking Londonderry and Carson “for the great lead they have given us in recent difficult weeks “—­an allusion to the Churchill incident that was not lost on the audience—­added with a blunt directness characteristic of the speaker:  “If they are going to put Lord Londonderry and Sir Edward Carson into the dock, they will have to find one large enough to hold the whole Unionist Party.”

The Balmoral demonstration was recognised on all sides as one of the chief landmarks in the Ulster Movement.  The Craigavon policy was not only reaffirmed with greater emphasis than before by the people of Ulster themselves, but it received the deliberate endorsement of the Unionist Party in England and Scotland.  Moreover, as Mr. Long’s speech explicitly promised, and Mr. Bonar Law’s speech unmistakably implied, British support was not to be dependent on Ulster’s opposition to Home Rule being kept within strictly legal limits.  Indeed, it had become increasingly evident that opposition so limited must be impotent, since, as Mr. Bonar Law pointed out, Ministers and their majority in the House of Commons were in Mr. Redmond’s pocket, and had no choice but to “toe the line,” while the “boom” which they had erected by the Parliament Act cut off Ulster from access to the British constituencies, unless that boom could be burst as the boom across the Foyle was broken by the Mountjoy in 1689.  The Unionist leader had warned the Ulstermen that in these circumstances they must expect nothing from Parliament, but must trust in themselves.  They did not mistake his meaning, and they were quite ready to take his advice.