and disorder?  Besides justice, according to the only ideas which we can have of it, supposes a fixt desire to render every one his due.  But theologians constantly preach that God owes us nothing, that the good things he affords are the voluntary effects of his beneficence, and that without any violence of his equity he can dispose of his creatures as his choice or caprice may impel him.  In this doctrine I see not the smallest shadow of justice, but the most hideous tyranny and shocking abuse of power.  In fact do we not see virtue and innocence plunged into an abyss of misery, while wickedness rears its triumphant head under the empire of this God whose justice is so much extalled?  “This misery, say you, is but for a time.”  Very well, Sirs, but your God is unjust for a time.  “He chastises whom he loves (you will say) for their own benefit.”  But if he is perfectly good, why will he let them suffer at all?  “He does it, perhaps to try them” But, if he knows all things, what occasion is there for him to try any?  If he is omnipotent, why need he vex himself about the vain design any one may form against him?  Omnipotence ought to be exempt from any such passions, as having neither equals nor rivals.  But if this God is jealous of his glory, his titles and prerogative, why does he permit such numbers of men to offend him?  Why are any found daring enough to refuse the incense which his pride expects? Why am I a feeble mortal permitted to attack his titles, his attributes, and even his existence? Is this permission of punishment on me for the abuse of his grace and favour?  He should never have permitted me to abuse them.  Or the grace he bestowed should have been efficacious and have directed my steps according to his liking.  “But, say you, he makes man free.”  Alas? why did he present him with a gift of which he must have foreseen the abuse?  Is this faculty of free agency, which enables me to resist his power, to corrupt and rob him of his worshippers, and in fine to bring eternal misery on myself, a present worthy of his infinite goodness?  In consequence of the pretended abuse of this fatal present, which an omniscient and good God ought not to have bestowed on Beings capable of abusing it, everlasting, inexpressible torments are reserved for the transitory crimes of a Being made liable to commit them.  Would that father be called good, reasonable, just and kind, who put a sharp-edged and dangerous knife into the hand of a playful, and imprudent child, whom he before knew to be imprudent, and punished him during the remainder of his life for cutting himself with it?  Would that prince be called just and merciful, who, not regarding any proportion between the offence and the punishment, should perpetually exercise his power of vengeance, over one of his subjects who, being drunk, had rashly offended against his vanity, without causing any real harm to him, especially, when the prince had taken pains to make him drunk?  Should we consider as almighty a monarch, whose dominions were