FOOTNOTES: 

[Footnote 56:  Quoted by A.M.  Pooley, Japan’s Foreign Policy, Allen & Unwin, 1920, p. 18.]

[Footnote 57:  Op. cit. p. 16 n.]

[Footnote 58:  Pooley, op. cit. p. 17.]

[Footnote 59:  A.M.  Pooley, Japan’s Foreign Policies, pp. 48-51.]

[Footnote 60:  This line was subsequently built by the Japanese.]

[Footnote 61:  Pooley, op. cit., pp. 67-8.]

[Footnote 62:  Page 66.]

CHAPTER VIII

JAPAN AND CHINA DURING THE WAR

The most urgent problem in China’s relations with foreign powers is Japanese aggression.  Originally Japan was less powerful than China, but after 1868 the Japanese rapidly learnt from us whatever we had to teach in the way of skilful homicide, and in 1894 they resolved to test their new armaments upon China, just as Bismarck tested his on Denmark.  The Chinese Government preserved its traditional haughtiness, and appears to have been quite unaware of the defeat in store for it.  The question at issue was Korea, over which both Powers claimed suzerainty.  At that time there would have been no reason for an impartial neutral to take one side rather than the other.  The Japanese were quickly and completely victorious, but were obliged to fight Russia before obtaining secure possession of Korea.  The war with Russia (1904-5) was fought chiefly in Manchuria, which the Russians had gained as a reward for befriending China.  Port Arthur and Southern Manchuria up to Mukden were acquired by the Japanese as a result of the Russo-Japanese war; the rest of Manchuria came under Japanese control as a result of Russia’s collapse after the Great War.

The nominal sovereignty in Manchuria is still Chinese; the Chinese have the civil administration, an army, and the appointment of the Viceroy.  But the Japanese also have troops in Manchuria; they have the railways, the industrial enterprises, and the complete economic and military control.  The Chinese Viceroy could not remain in power a week if he were displeasing to the Japanese, which, however, he takes care not to be.  (See Note A.) The same situation was being brought about in Shantung.

Shantung brings us to what Japan did in the Great War.  In 1914, China could easily have been induced to join the Allies and to set to work to turn the Germans out of Kiao-Chow, but this did not suit the Japanese, who undertook the work themselves and insisted upon the Chinese remaining neutral (until 1917).  Having captured Tsing-tau, they presented to the Chinese the famous Twenty-One Demands, which gave the Chinese Question its modern form.  These demands, as originally presented in January 1915, consisted of five groups.  The first dealt with Shantung, demanding that China should agree in advance to whatever terms Japan might ultimately make with Germany as regarded this Chinese