The Atlantic Monthly, Volume 09, No. 51, January, 1862 eBook
Various
mere inventions, if they are not an attempt to classify
for our own convenience the objects we study, then
they are thoughts which, whether we detect them or
not, are expressed in Nature,—then Nature
is the work of thought, the production of intelligence
carried out according to plan, therefore premeditated,—and
in our study of natural objects we are approaching
the thoughts of the Creator, reading His conceptions,
interpreting a system that is His and not ours.
All the divergence from the simplicity and grandeur
of this division of the animal kingdom arises from
an inability to distinguish between a plan and the
execution, of a plan. We allow the details to
shut out the plan itself, which exists quite independent
of special forms. I hope we shall find a meaning
in all these plans that will prove them to be the parts
of one great conception and the work of one Mind.
II.
Proceeding upon the view that there is a close analogy
between the way in which every individual student
penetrates into Nature and the progress of science
as a whole in the history of humanity, I continue my
sketch of the successive steps that have led to our
present state of knowledge. I began with Aristotle,
and showed that this great philosopher, though he prepared
a digest of all the knowledge belonging to his time,
yet did not feel the necessity of any system or of
any scientific language differing from the common
mode of expression of his day. He presents his
information as a man with his eyes open narrates in
a familiar style what he sees. As civilization
spread and science had its representatives in other
countries besides Greece, it became indispensable
to have a common scientific language, a technical
nomenclature, combining many objects under common
names, and enabling every naturalist to express the
results of his observations readily and simply in
a manner intelligible to all other students of Natural
History.
Linnaeus devised such a system, and to him we owe
a most simple and comprehensive scientific mode of
designating animals and plants. It may at first
seem no advantage to give up the common names of the
vernacular and adopt the unfamiliar ones, but a word
of explanation will make the object clear. Perceiving,
for instance, the close relations between certain
members of the larger groups, Linnaeus gave to them
names that should be common to all, and which are
called generic names,—as we speak of Ducks,
when we would designate in one word the Mallard, the
Widgeon, the Canvas-Back, etc.; but to these
generic names he added qualifying epithets, called
specific names, to indicate the different kinds in
each group. For example, the Lion, the Tiger,
the Panther, the Domestic Cat constitute such a natural
group, which Linnaeus called Felis, Cat, indicating
the whole genus; but the species he designates as Felis
catus, the Domestic Cat,—Felis leo,
the Lion,—Felis tigris, the Tiger,—Felis
panthera, the Panther. So he called all the
Dogs Canis; but for the different kinds we
have Canis familiaris, the Domestic Dog,—Canis
lupus, the Wolf,—Canis vulpes,
the Fox, etc.
