freely speaking with them in their own language, but perceives here and there men of “strong personality” in the sense of the above-quoted passage.  Now it seems to me that if “impersonality” in the corresponding sense were a race characteristic, due to the nature of their psychic being, then the occurrence of so many commanding personalities in Japan would be inexplicable.  Heroes and widespread hero-worship[CW] could hardly arise were there no commanding personalities.  The feudal order lent itself without doubt to the development of such a spirit.  But the feudal order could hardly have arisen or even maintained itself for centuries without commanding personalities, much less could it have created them.  The whole feudal order was built on an exalted oligarchy.  It was an order which emphasized persons, not principles; the law of the land was not the will of the multitudes, but of a few select persons.  While, therefore, it is beyond dispute that the old social order was communal in type, and so did not give freedom to the individual, nor tend to develop strong personality among the masses, it is also true that it did develop men of commanding personality among the rulers.  Those who from youth were in the hereditary line of rule, sons of Shoguns, daimyos, and samurai, were forced by the very communalism of the social order to an exceptional personal development.  They shot far ahead of the common man.  Feudalism is favorable to the development of personality in the favored few, while it represses that of the masses.  Individualism, on the contrary, giving liberty of thought and act, with all that these imply, is favorable to the development of the personality of all.

In view of the discussions of this chapter, is it not evident that advocates of the “impersonal” theory of Japanese mind and civilization not only ignore many important elements of the civilization they attempt to interpret, but also base their interpretation on a mistaken conception of personality?  We may not, however, leave the discussion at this point, for important considerations still demand our attention if we would probe this problem of personality to its core.

XXXII

IS BUDDHISM IMPERSONAL?

Advocates of Japanese “impersonality” call attention to the phenomena of self-suppression in religion.  It seems strange, however, that they who present this argument fail to see how “self-suppression” undermines their main contention.  If “self-suppression” be actually attained, it can only be by a people advanced so far as to have passed through and beyond the “personal” stage of existence.  “Self-suppression” cannot be a characteristic of a primitive people, a people that has not yet reached the stage of consciousness of self.  If the alleged “impersonality” of the Orient is that of a primitive people that has not yet reached the stage of self-consciousness, then it cannot have the characteristic of “self-suppression.”  If, on the other hand, it is the “impersonality” of “self-suppression,” then it is radically different from that of a primitive people.  Advocates of “impersonality” present both conceptions, quite unconscious apparently that they are mutually exclusive.  If either conception is true, the other is false.