Russell had no intention of holding further interviews with the Southern Commissioners[227], but before anyone in Washington could learn of this there was general knowledge of a changed tone from the Secretary of State, and Lyons’ fears were considerably allayed.  On June 15, occurred that interview between Seward, Lyons, and Mercier, in which Seward had positively refused to receive the Queen’s Proclamation, but had throughout evinced the greatest courtesy and goodwill.  Lyons so reported the conversation[228].  June 15 may, in fact, be taken as the date when Lyons ceased to be alarmed over an immediate war.  Possibly he found it a little difficult to report so sudden a shift from stormy to fair weather.  June 21, he wrote that the “lull” was still continuing[229].  June 24, he at last learned and described at length the details of Lincoln’s alteration of Despatch No. 10[230].  He did not know the exact date but he expressed the opinion that “a month or three weeks ago” war was very near—­a misjudgment, since it should be remembered that war seemed advisable to one man only—­Seward; and that on this issue he had been definitely cast down from his self-assumed leadership into the ranks of Lincoln’s lieutenants.

Lyons was, then, nearly a month behindhand in exact knowledge of American foreign policy toward England, and he was in error in thinking that an American attack on England was either imminent or intended.  Nevertheless, he surely was excusable, considering Seward’s prestige and Lincoln’s lack of it, in reporting as he did.  It was long, indeed, before he could escape from suspicion of Seward’s purposes, though dropping, abruptly, further comment on the chances of war.  A month later, on July 20, he wrote that Seward had himself asked for a confidential and unofficial interview, in order to make clear that there never had been any intention of stirring agitation against England.  Personally, Seward took credit for avoiding trouble “by refusing to take official cognizance of the recognition [by England] of the belligerent rights of the South,” and he asked Lyons to explain to Russell that previous strong language was intended merely to make foreign Powers understand the intensity of Northern feeling[231].

Lyons put no faith in all this but was happy to note the change, mistakenly attributing it to England’s “stiff tone,” and not at all to the veto of the President.  Since Lyons himself had gone to the utmost bounds in seeking conciliation (so he had reported), and, in London, Russell also had taken no forward step since the issue of the Queen’s Proclamation—­indeed, had rather yielded somewhat to Adams’ representations—­it is not clear in what the “stiff tone” consisted.