[Footnote 1109:  U.S.  Diplomatic Correspondence, 1863, Pt.  I, p. 329.  Adams to Seward, July 30, 1863.]

[Footnote 1110:  Mason, Mason, p. 449.]

[Footnote 1111:  Sept. 4, 1863.  The Times was now printing American correspondence sharply in contrast to that which preceded Gettysburg when the exhaustion and financial difficulties of the North were dilated upon.  Now, letters from Chicago, dated August 30, declared that, to the writer’s astonishment, the West gave every evidence that the war had fostered rather than checked, prosperity. (Sept. 15, 1863.).]

[Footnote 1112:  Mason Papers.  Mason to Slidell, Sept. 14 and 15, 1863.  Slidell to Mason, Sept. 16, 1863.]

[Footnote 1113:  McRea wrote to Hotze, September 17, 1863, that in his opinion Slidell and Hotze were the only Southern agents of value diplomatically in Europe (Hotze Correspondence).  He thought all others would soon be recalled.  Slidell, himself, even in his letter to Mason, had the questionable taste of drawing a rosy picture of his own and his family’s intimate social intercourse with the Emperor and the Empress.]

[Footnote 1114:  Sept. 23, 1863.]

[Footnote 1115:  e.g., Manchester Guardian, Sept. 23, 1863, quoted in The Index, Sept. 24, p. 343.]

[Footnote 1116:  Mason’s Mason, p. 456.]

[Footnote 1117:  Russell Papers.  To Russell, Oct. 26, 1863.]

[Footnote 1118:  Ibid., Lyons wrote after receiving a copy of a despatch sent by Russell to Grey, in France, dated October 10, 1863.]

[Footnote 1119:  F.O., Am., 896.  No. 788.  Confidential.  Lyons to Russell, Nov. 3, 1863.  “It seems, in fact, to be certain that at the commencement of a war with Great Britain, the relative positions of the United States and its adversary would be very nearly the reverse of what they would have been if a war had broken out three or even two years ago.  Of the two Powers, the United States would now be the better prepared for the struggle—­the coasts of the United States would present few points open to attack—­while the means of assailing suddenly our own ports in the neighbourhood of this country, and especially Bermuda and the Bahamas, would be in immediate readiness.  Three years ago Great Britain might at the commencement of a war have thrown a larger number of trained troops into the British Provinces on the continent than could have been immediately sent by the United States to invade those provinces.  It seems no exaggeration to say that the United States could now without difficulty send an Army exceeding in number, by five to one, any force which Great Britain would be likely to place there.”]

[Footnote 1120:  Ibid., Private.  Lyons to Russell, Nov. 3, 1863.]

[Footnote 1121:  Lyons Papers.  To Lyons.]

[Footnote 1122:  Rhodes, IV, p. 393.  Nov. 20, 1863.]