[Footnote 566:  Ibid., Spence to Mason, Feb. 20, 1862.]

[Footnote 567:  Mason, Mason p. 258.]

[Footnote 568:  Slidell in France at first took the tack of urging that Continental interests and British interests in the blockade were “directly antagonistic,” basing his argument on England’s forward look as a sea power (Slidell to Hunter, Feb. 26, 1862.  Richardson, II, p. 186).]

[Footnote 569:  Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords, Vol.  XXV.  “Papers relating to the Blockade.”]

[Footnote 570:  Hansard, 3rd.  Ser., CLXV, pp. 1158-1230, and pp. 1233-43.]

[Footnote 571:  Mason’s authenticated statistics, unfortunately for his cause, only came down to Oct. 31, 1861, a fact which might imply that after that date the blockade was rapidly becoming effective and which certainly did indicate that it was at least sufficiently effective to prevent regular and frequent communications between the government at Richmond and its agents abroad.  Did Russell have this in mind when he promptly incorporated Mason’s figures in the papers presented to Parliament?  These figures showed that according to reports from four Southern ports, sixty vessels had entered and cleared between April 29 and October 31, 1861; unauthenticated statistics extending to the date December 31, presented by Mason of vessels arrived at and departing from Cuban ports showed forty-eight vessels, each way engaged in blockade running.  Seven of these were listed as “captured.”  Those reaching Cuba were described as twenty-six British, 14 Confederate, 3 Spanish, 3 American and 2 Mexican, but in none of these statistics were the names of the vessels given, for obvious reasons, in the printed paper though apparently included in the list submitted by Mason.  These figures did in fact but reveal a situation existing even after 1861.  The American blockading fleets had to be created from all sorts of available material and were slow in getting under way.  Regular ships of the old Navy could not enforce it being too few in number, and also, at first, directing their efforts to the capture of shore positions which would render a large blockading squadron unnecessary.  This proved an abortive effort and it was not until 1862 that the development of a large fleet of blockaders was seriously undertaken. (See Fox, Confid.  Corresp., I, pp. 110, 115, 119 and especially 122, which, May 31, 1862, pays tribute to the energy with which the South for “thirteen long months” had defended its important port shore lines.) If Gregory had been able to quote a report by Bunch from Charleston of April 5, 1862, he would have had a strong argument.  “The blockade runners are doing a great business....  Everything is brought in in abundance.  Not a day passes without an arrival or a departure.  The Richmond Government sent about a month ago an order to Nassau for Medicines, Quinine, etc.  It went from Nassau to New York, was executed there, came back to Nassau, thence here, and was on its way to Richmond in 21 days from the date of the order.  Nearly all the trade is under the British flag.  The vessels are all changed in Nassau and Havana.  Passengers come and go freely and no one seems to think that there is the slightest risk—­which, indeed, there is not.” (Lyons Papers.  Bunch to Lyons, April 5, 1862).]