[Footnote 495: Liberator, Feb. 7, 1862. Giving an account of a meeting at Bromley-by-Bow.]
[Footnote 496: Trollope, North America (Chapman & Hall, London, 1862), I, p. 446. Trollope left England in August, 1861, and returned in the spring of 1862. He toured the North and the West, was a close observer, and his work, published in midsummer 1862, was very serviceable to the North, since he both stated the justice of the Northern cause and prophesied its victory.]
[Footnote 497: Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXV, p. 12 seq., though not consecutive as the speeches were made in the course of the debate on the Address to the Throne.]
[Footnote 498: Schleiden Papers. Schleiden to the Senate of Bremen.]
[Footnote 499: State Dept., Eng., Vol. 78. No. 114. Adams to Seward, Feb. 13, 1862.]
[Footnote 500: Pickett Papers. Hotze to Hunter, March 11, 1862.]
[Footnote 501: Lyons Papers. Russell to Lyons, Feb. 8, 1862.]
The six months following the affair of the Trent constituted a period of comparative calm in the relations of Great Britain and America, but throughout that period there was steadily coming to the front a Northern belligerent effort increasingly effective, increasingly a cause for disturbance to British trade, and therefore more and more a matter for anxious governmental consideration. This was the blockade of Southern ports and coast line, which Lincoln had declared in intention in his proclamation of April 19, 1861.
As early as December, 1860, Lyons had raised the question of the relation of British ships and merchants to the secession port of Charleston, South Carolina, and had received from Judge Black an evasive reply. In March, 1861, Russell had foreseen the possibility of a blockade, writing to Lyons that American precedent would at least require it to be an effective one, while Lyons made great efforts to convince Seward that any interference with British trade would be disastrous to the Northern cause in England. He even went so far as to hint at British intervention to preserve trade. But on April 15, Lyons, while believing that no effective blockade was possible, thought that the attempt to institute one was less objectionable than legislation “closing the Southern Ports as Ports of Entry,” in reality a mere paper blockade and one which would “justify Great Britain and France in recognizing the Southern Confederacy....” Thus he began to weaken in opposition to any interference. His earlier expressions to Seward were but arguments, without committing his Government to a line of policy, and were intended to make Seward step cautiously.