Great Britain and the American Civil War eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 680 pages of information about Great Britain and the American Civil War.

[Footnote 383:  Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, Nov. 12. 1861.  He added, “The dismissal of Bunch seems to me a singular mixture of the bully and coward.”]

[Footnote 384:  Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords, Vol.  XXV.  “Correspondence on the Withdrawal of Bunch’s Exequatur.”  No. 26.  Russell to Adams, Dec. 9, 1861.]

[Footnote 385:  Bonham, British Consuls in the Confederacy, p. 45.  Columbia University, Studies in History, Economics and Public Law, XI-III.  No. 3.  Bonham shows that Bunch was more pro-Southern than Lyons thought.  Lyons had suggested that Bunch be permitted to remain privately at Charleston. (Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords, Vol.  XXV.  “Correspondence on the Withdrawal of Bunch’s Exequatur.”  No. 29.  Lyons to Russell, Dec. 31, 1861.) That Bunch was after all regarded by the United States as a scapegoat may be argued from the “curious circumstance that in 1875, Mr. Bunch, being then British Minister resident at Bogota, acted as arbitrator in a case between the United States and Colombia.” (Moore, Int.  Law Digest, V, p. 22.)]

[Footnote 386:  Bancroft, Seward, II, p. 203, says that if Great Britain ever attempted another negotiation “that British representatives were careful to preserve perfect secrecy.”  I have found no evidence of any similar communication with the South.]

[Footnote 387:  As early as April, 1861, Stoeckl reported Mercier as urging Lyons and Stoeckl to secure from their respective Governments authority to recognize the South whenever they thought “the right time” had come.  Lyons did not wish to have this responsibility, arguing that the mere fact of such a decision being left to him would embarrass him in his relations with the North.  Stoeckl also opposed Mercier’s idea, and added that Russia could well afford to wait until England and France had acted.  Russia could then also recognize the South without offending the North. (Russian Archives.  Stoeckl to F.O., April 2-14, 1861.  No. 863.)]

[Footnote 388:  Russell Papers.  Lyons to Russell, Oct. 4, 1861.]

[Footnote 389:  Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, Oct. 8, 1861.  On Oct. 7, Lyons wrote to Head, “If we can get through the winter and spring without American cotton, and keep the peace, we shall attain a great object.” (Lyons Papers.)]

[Footnote 390:  F.O., America, 772.  No. 585.  Lyons to Russell, Oct. 21, 1861.]

[Footnote 391:  Ibid., Vol. 773.  No. 606.  Lyons to Russell.  Confidential.  Oct. 28, 1861.]

[Footnote 392:  Walpole, Russell, II, 344.]

[Footnote 393:  See ante, p. 194.]

[Footnote 394:  “The Americans certainly seem inclined to pick a quarrel with us; but I doubt their going far enough even to oblige us to recognize the Southern States.  A step further would enable us to open the Southern ports, but a war would nevertheless be a great calamity.”  (Maxwell, Clarendon, II, 245.  Granville to Clarendon.  No exact date is given but the context shows it to have been in October, 1861.)]

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