All this was not without effect upon the Korean mind.  The people of the north had learnt to dislike the Russians, because of their lack of discipline and want of restraint.  They had been alienated in particular by occasional interference with Korean women by the Russian soldiers.  I travelled largely throughout the northern regions in the early days of the war, and everywhere I heard from the people during the first few weeks nothing but expressions of friendship to the Japanese.  The coolies and farmers were friendly because they hoped that Japan would modify the oppression of the native magistrates.  A section of better-class people, especially those who had received some foreign training, were sympathetic, because they credited Japan’s promises and had been convinced by old experience that no far-reaching reforms could come to their land without foreign aid.

As victory followed victory, however, the attitude of the Japanese grew less kindly.  A large number of petty tradesmen followed the army, and these showed none of the restraint of the military.  They travelled about, sword in hand, taking what they wished and doing as they pleased.  Then the army cut down the rate of pay for coolies, and, from being overpaid, the native labourers were forced to toil for half their ordinary earnings.  The military, too, gradually began to acquire a more domineering air.

In Seoul itself a definite line of policy was being pursued.  The Korean Government had employed a number of foreign advisers.  These were steadily eliminated; some of them were paid up for the full time of their engagements and sent off, and others were told that their agreements would not be renewed.  Numerous Japanese advisers were brought in, and, step by step, the administration was Japanized.  This process was hastened by a supplementary agreement concluded in August, when the Korean Emperor practically handed the control of administrative functions over to the Japanese.  He agreed to engage a Japanese financial adviser, to reform the currency, to reduce his army, to adopt Japanese military and educational methods, and eventually to trust the foreign relations to Japan.  One of the first results of this new agreement was that Mr. (now Baron) Megata was given control of the Korean finances.  He quickly brought extensive and, on the whole, admirable changes into the currency.  Under the old methods, Korean money was among the worst in the world.  The famous gibe of a British Consul in an official report, that the Korean coins might be divided into good, good counterfeits, bad counterfeits, and counterfeits so bad that they can only be passed off in the dark, was by no means an effort of imagination.  In the days before the war it was necessary, when one received any sum of money, to employ an expert to count over the coins, and put aside the worst counterfeits.  The old nickels were so cumbersome that a very few pounds’ worth of them formed a heavy load for a pony.  Mr. Megata changed all this, and put the currency on a sound basis, naturally not without some temporary trouble, but certainly with permanent benefit to the country.