The French plan of campaign was indeed based on the delivery of unforeseen attacks.  The strong fleets of war and transport ships were to be utilized to land a considerable force in Northern Prussia, and there engage a part of the Prussian troops, while the main body of the army, it was supposed, would await the French attack behind the fortresses on the Rhine.  The French intended to cross the Rhine at once, at and below Strassburg, thus avoiding the great fortresses; and also, at the start, preventing the South-German army, which was destined to defend the Black Forest, from uniting with the North-Germans.  To execute this plan it would have been imperative to assemble the main forces of the French army in Alsace.  Railway accommodation, however, was so inadequate that in the first instance it was only possible to carry 100,000 men to Strassburg; 150,000 had to leave the railways near Metz, and remain there till they could be moved up.  Fifty thousand men were encamped at Chalons as reserves, 115 battalions were ready to march as soon as the National Guard had taken their places in the interior.  The various corps were distributed as follows: 

Imperial Guard, General Bourbaki—­Nancy.

Ist Corps, Marshal MacMahon—­Strassburg.

IId Corps, General Frossard—­St. Avold.

IIId Corps, Marshal Bazaine—­Metz.

IVth Corps, General Ladmirault—­Diedenhofen.

Vth Corps, General Failly—­Bitsch.

VIth Corps, Marshal Canrobert—­Chalons.

VIIth Corps, General Felix Douay—­Belfort.

Thus there were only two Corps in Alsace, and five on the Moselle; and, on the day of the declaration of war, one of these, the IId Corps, was pushed forward close to the German frontier, near St. Avold and Forbach.  This IId Corps, however, received instructions not to engage in any serious conflict.

The regiments had marched out of quarters incomplete as to numbers, and insufficiently equipped.  Meanwhile the reserves called out to fill their place had choked the railway traffic; they crowded the depots, and filled the railway stations.

The progress to their destination was delayed, for it was often unknown at the railway stations where the regiments to which the reserves were to be sent were at the time encamped.  When they at last joined they were without the most necessary articles of equipment.  The Corps and Divisions had no artillery or baggage, no ambulances, and only a very insufficient number of officers.  No magazines had been established beforehand, and the troops were to depend on the fortresses.  These were but ill-supplied, for in the assured expectation that the armies would be almost immediately sent on into the enemy’s country they had been neglected.

In the same way the Staff-officers had been provided with maps of Germany, but not of their own provinces.  The Ministry of War in Paris was inundated with claims, protestations, and expostulations, and finally it was left to the troops to help themselves as best they could. On se debrouillera was the hope of the authorities.