attention mainly by reason of his curiously cut leopard-skin overcoat.  The real author of the charge seems to have been James Buchanan, and Kremer was simple-minded and credulous enough to be made the catspaw in the business.  Clay was taken aback.  Kremer significantly made no reference to the “code of honor”; and since a duel with such a personage would be an absurdity, Clay substituted a request that the House make an immediate investigation of the charges.  A committee of seven was appointed.  But when it summoned Kremer to give his testimony, he refused to appear, on the ground—­which in the present instance was a mere pretext—­that the House had no jurisdiction over the conduct of its members outside the chamber.

The truth of the matter is that Kremer was only a tool in the hands of the Jackson managers.  He admitted privately to members of the committee that he did not write the letter in the Observer, and it was plain enough that he did not understand its purport.  His promise to substantiate its contents was made in a moment of surprise, because somebody had neglected to coach him on the point.

Finding that it could make no headway, the committee reported the fact, on the 9th of February, and the investigation was dropped.  This was precisely what the Jackson managers wanted.  Whatever happened, Jackson would be the gainer.  “If Clay transferred his following to Adams, the charge would gain credence with the masses; if he were not made Secretary of State, it would be alleged that honest George Kremer (an ardent Jacksonian) had exposed the bargain and prevented its consummation."[6]

Was this charge of a “corrupt bargain” well founded?  For a generation every public man had views on that subject for which he was ready to fight; mid-century and later historians came to conclusions of the most contradictory nature.  The pros and cons are too complicated to be presented here, but certain things are fairly clear.  In two elaborate speeches Clay marshaled evidence that before leaving Kentucky he decided to support Adams in preference to Jackson and Crawford.  This evidence did not convince the Jacksonians; but it could hardly have been expected to do so, and nowadays it looks to be unimpeachable.  It is certain that the friends of Clay approached the Adams managers with a view to a working agreement involving the Secretaryship of State; but it is equally clear that the Jackson and Crawford men solicited Clay’s support “by even more unblushing offers of political reward than those alleged against Adams.”  Finally it is known that Adams gave some explicit preelection pledges, and that by doing so he drew some votes; but on the subject of an alliance with Clay he is not known to have gone further than to say to a delegation of Clay supporters that if elected by western votes he would naturally look to the West for much of the support which his Administration would need.  At noon, on the 9th of February, the Senate and House