“The people of Manila,” I answered, “are quiet because they have no arms and because as merchants and landlords they fear that their valuable properties and money in the banks will be confiscated by the Spaniards if they rise up and begin burning and destroying the property of others.  On this account they had ostensibly accepted autonomy, not because that was what they wanted but more as a means of deceiving the Spaniards and being allowed to live in peace; but I am confident that all the Filipinos in Manila are for independence, as will be proved the very day our troops capture Manila.  At that time I fully expect the people of Manila will join with us in raising loud cheers for the Independence of the Philippines, making fresh demonstrations of loyalty to our Government.”

I also told him it was true that a Mixed Commission had arrived and in the name of General Augustin and Archbishop Nozaleda made certain proposals; but they made known to us their intention to adhere to our Cause.  The members of the Commission said the Spaniards instructed them to say they came motu propio [2] without being formally appointed or ‘coached’ by the Spanish authorities in what they should say, representing, on the contrary, that they were faithful interpreters of the sentiment of the people of Manila and that they had good reason for believing that if I was willing to accept autonomy General Augustin and Archbishop Nozaleda would recognize my rank of General, and that of my companions, would give me the $1,000,000 indemnity agreed upon at Biak-na-bato and still unpaid, as well as liberal rewards for and salaries to the members of a popular Assembly promises which the Commissioners did not put any faith in, though some of them held the opinion that the money should be accepted because it would reduce the funds of the Spanish Government and also because the money had been wrung from Filipinos.  The Commissioners, I added, left after assuring me that the people in Manila would rise against the Spaniards if supplied with arms, and that the best thing I could do was to make an attack on Manila at the places they pointed out as being the weakest parts of the Spanish defense and consequently the easiest to overcome.

I thanked the Commission for their loyalty and straightforwardness, told them they would be given an escort to take them safely back to the Spanish lines, and that when they got back they should inform those who had sent them that they were not received because they were not duly accredited and that even if they had brought credentials according to what they had seen and heard from the Revolutionists Don Emilio Aguinaldo would certainly not consider, much less accept, their proposals respecting autonomy because the Filipino people had sufficient experience to govern themselves, that they are tired of being victimised and subjected to gross abuses by a foreign nation under whose domination they have no wish to continue to live, but rather wish for their independence.  Therefore the Spaniards might prepare to defend their sovereignty, for the Filipino Army would vigorously assault the city and with unflagging zeal prosecute the siege until Manila was captured.