(2) Our constitution may be such that we are pained by the sight of an object in distress, and give assistance, to relieve ourselves of the pain.  This was the view of Hobbes; and it is also admitted by Mandeville as a secondary motive.

(3) We may be so formed as to derive enjoyment from the performance of acts of kindness, in the same immediate way that we are gratified by warmth, flowers, or music; we should thus be moved to benevolence by an intrinsic pleasure, and not by extraneous consequences.

Bentham speaks of the pleasures and the pains of Benevolence, meaning that we derive pleasure from causing pleasure to others, and pain from the sight of pain in others.

(4) It may be affirmed that, although we have not by nature any purely disinterested impulses, these are generated in us by associations and habits, in a manner similar to the conversion of means into final ends, as in the case of money.  This is the view propounded by James Mill, and by Mackintosh.

Allowance being made for a certain amount of fact in these various modes of connecting Benevolence with self, it is still maintained in the present work, as by Butler, Hume, Adam Smith, and others, that human beings are (although very unequally) endowed with a prompting to relieve the pains and add to the pleasures of others, irrespective of all self-regarding considerations; and that such prompting is not a product of associations with self.

In the ancient world, purely disinterested conduct was abundantly manifested in practice, although not made prominent in Ethical Theory.  The enumeration of the Cardinal Virtues does not expressly contain Benevolence; but under Courage, Self-sacrifice was implied.  Patriotic Self-devotion, Love, and Friendship were virtues highly cultivated.  In Cicero, Seneca, and Marcus Aurelius, there is a recognition of general Benevolence.

The two heads now sketched—­The Standard and the Psychology of our Moral nature—­almost entirely exhaust modern Ethics.  Smith, Stewart, and Mackintosh agree in laying down as the points in dispute these two:—­First, What does virtue consist in?  Secondly, What is the power or faculty of the mind that discovers and enforces it?

These two positions, however, are inadequate as regards Ancient Ethics.  For remedying the deficiency, and for bringing to light matters necessary to the completeness of an Ethical survey, we add the following heads:—­

III.  The Theory of what constitutes the Supreme END of Life, the BONUM or the SUMMUM BONUM.  The question as to the highest End has divided the Ethical Schools, both ancient and modern.  It was the point at issue between the Stoics and the Epicureans.  That Happiness is not the highest end has been averred, in modern times, by Butler and others:  the opposite position is held by the supporters of Utility.  What may be called the severe and ascetic systems (theoretically) refuse to sanction any pursuit of happiness or pleasure, except through virtue, or duty to others.  The view practically proceeded upon, now and in most ages, is that virtue discharges a man’s obligations to his fellows, which being accomplished, he is then at liberty to seek what pleases himself. (For the application of the laws of mind to the theory of HAPPINESS, see Appendix C.)