Moral Science; a Compendium of Ethics eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 408 pages of information about Moral Science; a Compendium of Ethics.

CHAPTER II.

The ethical standard.

 1.  Ethics, as a department of Practice, is defined by its End.

 2.  The Ethical End is the welfare of society, realized through rules
    of conduct duly enforced.

 3.  The Rules of Ethics are of two kinds.  The first are imposed under
    a penalty.  These are Laws proper, or Obligatory Morality.

 4.  The second are supported by Rewards; constituting Optional
    Morality, Merit, Virtue, or Nobleness.

 5.  The Ethical End, or Morality, as it has been, is founded partly
    in Utility, and partly in Sentiment.

 6.  The Ethical End is limited, according to the view taken of Moral
    Government, or Authority:—­Distinction between Security and
    Improvement.

 7.  Morality, in its essential parts, is ‘Eternal and Immutable;’ in
    other parts, it varies with custom.

 8.  Enquiry as to the kind, of proof that an Ethical Standard is
    susceptible of.  The ultimate end of action must be referred to
    individual judgment.

 9.  The judgment of Mankind is, with some qualifications, in favour of
    Happiness as the supreme end of conduct.

10.  The Ethical end that society is tending to, is Happiness, or
    Utility.

11.  Objections against Utility.  I.—­Happiness is not the sole aim of
    human pursuit.

12.  II.—­The consequences of actions are beyond calculation.

13.  III.—­The principle of Utility contains no motives to seek the
    happiness of others.

CHAPTER III.

The moral faculty.

 1.  Question whether the Moral Faculty be simple or complex.

 2.  Arguments in favour of its being simple and intuitive:—­First, Our
    moral judgments are immediate and instantaneous.

 3.  Secondly, It is a faculty common to all mankind.

 4.  Thirdly, It is different from any other mental phenomenon.

 5.  Replies to these Arguments, and Counter-arguments:—–­First;
    Immediateness of operation is no proof of an innate origin.

 6.  Secondly, The alleged similarity of men’s moral judgments holds
    only in a limited degree.  Answers given by the advocates of an
    Innate sentiment, to the discrepancies.

 7.  Thirdly, Moral right and wrong is not an indivisible property, but
    an extensive Code of regulations.

 8.  Fourthly, Intuition is not sufficient to settle debated questions.

 9.  Fifthly, It is possible to analyze the Moral Faculty:—­Estimate of
    the operation of (1) Prudence, (2) Sympathy, and (3) the Emotions
    generally.

10.  The peculiar attribute of Rightness arises from the institution
    of Government or Authority.

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