that is to say, in youths; because, as the Philosopher
expresses it in the fourth book of the Ethics, shame,
bashfulness, modesty, is not praiseworthy nor good
in the old nor in men of studious habits, because
to them it is fit that they beware of those things
which would lead them to shame. In youths and
maidens such caution is not so much required, and
therefore in them the fear of receiving dishonour
through some fault is praiseworthy. It springs
from Nobility, and it is possible to account their
timid bashfulness to be Nobility. Baseness and
ignoble ways produce impudence: wherefore it
is a good and excellent sign of Nobility in children
and persons of tender years when, after some fault,
their shame is painted in their face, which blush
of shame is then the fruit of true Nobility.
When it proceeds to say, “Comes virtue from
what’s noble, as From black comes violet,”
the text advances to the desired definition of Nobility,
by which one may see what this Nobility is of which
so many people speak erroneously. It says then,
drawing a conclusion from that which has been said
before, that each Virtue, or rather its generator,
that is to say, the habit of right choice, which stands
firm in due moderation, will spring forth from this,
that is, Nobility. And it gives an example in
the colours, saying, as from the black the violet,
so this Virtue springs from Nobility. The violet
is a mixed colour of purple and black, but the black
prevails, and the colour is named from it. And
thus the Virtue is a mixed thing of Nobility and Passion;
but, because Nobility prevails, the Virtue takes its
name from it, and is called Goodness. Then afterwards
it argues, by that which has been said, that no man
ought to say boastfully, “I am of such and such
a race or family;” nor ought he to believe that
he is of this Nobility unless the fruits of it are
in him. And immediately it renders a reason,
saying that those who have this Grace, that is to say,
this Divine thing, are almost Gods as it were, without
spot of vice, and no one has the power to bestow this
except God alone, with whom there is no respect of
persons, even as Divine Scripture makes manifest.
And it does not appear too extravagant when it says,
“They are as Gods,” for as it is argued
previously in the seventh chapter of the third treatise,
even as there are men most vile and bestial so are
men most Noble and Divine. And this Aristotle
proves in the seventh chapter of Ethics by the text
of Homer the poet; therefore, let not those men who
are of the Uberti of Florence, nor those of the Visconti
of Milan, say, “Because I am of such a family
or race, I am Noble,” for the Divine seed falls
not into a race of men, that is, into a family; but
it falls into individual persons, and, as will be proved
below, the family does not make individual persons
Noble, but the individual persons make the family
Noble.
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