Meanwhile, since Gettysburg, no conspicuous event
had attracted attention in Virginia. The President
had been disappointed that Meade had not fought at
Williamsport, but soon afterward he gave decisive
advice against forcing a fight at a worse place in
order to cure the blunder of having let go the chance
to fight at the right place. About the middle
of September, however, when Lee had reduced his army
by leaves of absence and by dispatching Longstreet
to reinforce Bragg, Mr. Lincoln thought it a good
time to attack him. Meade, on the other hand,
now said that he did not feel strong enough to assault,
and this although he had 90,000 men “between
him and Washington,” and by his estimate the
whole force of the enemy, “stretching as far
as Richmond,” was only 60,000. “For
a battle, then,” wrote Mr. Lincoln, “General
Meade has three men to General Lee’s two.
Yet, it having been determined that choosing ground
and standing on the defensive gives so great advantage
that the three cannot safely attack the two, the three
are left simply standing on the defensive also.
If the enemy’s 60,000 are sufficient to keep
our 90,000 away from Richmond, why, by the same rule,
may not 40,000 of ours keep their 60,000 away from
Washington, leaving us 50,000 to put to some other
use?... I can perceive no fault in this statement,
unless we admit we are not the equal of the enemy man
for man.” But when, a few days later, Stanton
proposed to detach 30,000 men from Meade to Rosecrans,
Mr. Lincoln demurred, and would agree only to let go
13,000, whom Hooker took with him to Chattanooga.
Probably he did not wish to diminish the Federal strength
in Virginia.
Late in October, Lee, overestimating the number of
troops thus withdrawn, endeavored to move northward;
but Meade outmanoeuvred and outmarched him, and he
fell back behind the Rapidan. General Meade next
took his turn at the aggressive. Toward the close
of November he crossed the Rapidan with the design
of flanking and attacking Lee. But an untoward
delay gave the Southerners time to intrench themselves
so strongly that an attack was imprudent, and Meade
returned to the north bank of the stream. The
miscarriage hurt his reputation with the people, though
he was not to blame for it.
Now, as the severe season was about to begin, all
the armies both of the North and of the South, on
both sides of the mountain ranges, turned gladly into
winter quarters. Each had equal need to rest and
recuperate after hard campaigns and bloody battles.
For a while the war news was infrequent and insignificant;
and the cessation in the thunder of cannon and the
rattle of musketry gives opportunity again to hear
the voices of contending politicians. For a while
we must leave the warriors and give ear to the talkers.
FOOTNOTES:
[43] Palfrey, The Antietam and Fredericksburg,
132.
[44] Swinton says: “The moment he confronted
his antagonist he seemed to suffer a collapse of all
his powers.” Army of Potomac, 280.
