[37] For interesting statements about this Altoona
conference see McClure, Lincoln and Men of War-Times,
248-251.
[38] Blaine, i. 439.
[39] It was understood that he had not favored the
principal anti-slavery measures of the Thirty-seventh
Congress, on the ground measures of the Thirty-seventh
Congress, on the ground that they were premature.
[40] The foregoing-statistics have been taken from
Mr. Elaine, Twenty Years of Congress, i. 441-444.
[41] Later, legislation enabled the soldiers in the
field to vote; but at this time they could not do
so.
[42] For account of these matters of retaliation and
protection of negroes, see N. and H. vol. vi. ch.
xxi.
BATTLES AND SIEGES: DECEMBER, 1862-DECEMBER, 1863
The clouds of gloom and discouragement, which shut
so heavily about the President in the autumn of 1862,
did not disperse as winter advanced. That dreary
season, when nearly all doubted and many despaired,
is recognized now as an interlude between the two
grand divisions of the drama. Before it, the
Northern people had been enthusiastic, united, and
hopeful; after it, they saw assurance of success within
reach of a reasonable persistence. But while
the miserable days were passing, men could not see
into the mysterious future. Not only were armies
beaten, but the people themselves seemed to be deserting
their principles. The face and the form of the
solitary man, whose position brought every part of
this sad prospect fully within the range of his contemplation,
showed the wear of the times. The eyes went deeper
into their caverns, and seemed to send their search
farther than ever away into a receding distance; the
furrows sank far into the sallow face; a stoop bent
the shoulders, as if the burden of the soul had even
a physical weight. Yet still he sought neither
counsel, nor strength, nor sympathy from any one;
neither leaned on any friend, nor gave his confidence
to any adviser; the problems were his and the duty
was his, and he accepted both wholly. “I
need success more than I need sympathy,” he said;
for it was the cause, not his own burden, which absorbed
his thoughts. The extremists, who seemed to have
more than half forgotten to hate the South in the
intensity of their hatred of McClellan, had apparently
cherished a vague faith that, if this procrastinating
spirit could be exorcised, the war might then be trusted
to take care of itself. But after they had accomplished
their purpose they were confronted by facts which
showed that in this matter, as in that of emancipation,
the President’s deliberation was not the unpardonable
misdoing which they had conceived it to be. In
spite of McClellan’s insolent arrogance and
fault-finding, his unreasonable demands, and his tedious
squandering of invaluable time, Mr. Lincoln, being
by nature a man who contemplated the consequence of
