in his own mind, wrought out his conclusions by the
toil of his own brain, carried his entire burden wholly
upon his own shoulders, and in every part and way
met the full responsibility of his office in and by
himself alone. It does not appear that he ever
sought to be sustained or comforted or encouraged
amid disaster, that he ever endeavored to shift upon
others even the most trifling fragment of the load
which rested upon himself; and certainly he never
desired that any one should ever be a sharer in any
ill repute attendant upon a real or supposed mistake.
Silent as to matters of deep import, self-sustained,
facing alone all grave duties, solving alone all difficult
problems, and enduring alone all consequences, he
appears a man so isolated from his fellow men amid
such tests and trials, that one is filled with a sense
of awe, almost beyond sympathy, in the contemplation.
FOOTNOTES:
[4] This language was too vague to make known to us
now what Sumner’s demand was; for one of the
questions bitterly in dispute soon became: what
forces were properly to be regarded as available “for
the defense of the city.”
[5] McClellan says that he offered to General Hitchcock,
“who at that time held staff relations with
his excellency, the President, and the secretary of
war,” to submit a list of troops, to be left
for the defense of Washington, with their positions;
but Hitchcock replied that McClellan’s judgment
was sufficient in the matter. McClellan’s
Report, 683. Vol. II.
[6] By letter to the adjutant-general, wherein he
requested the transmission of the information to the
secretary of war. Report of Comm. on Conduct of
the War, ii. pt. i. 13. The addition in the
Report is erroneous, being given as 54,456 instead
of 55,456.
[7] See Comte de Paris, Civil War in America,
i. 626, 627.
[8] See discussion by Swinton, Army of Potomac,
108 et seq.
[9] Perhaps he was not justified in counting upon
it with such apparent assurance as he had done.
Webb, The Peninsula, 37-42.
[10] General Webb says that this question is “the
leading point of dispute in the campaign and may never
be satisfactorily set at rest.” But he
also says: “To allow the general to remain
in command, and then cut off the very arm with which
he was about to strike, we hold to have been inexcusable
and unmilitary to the last degree.” Swinton
condemns the withholding McDowell (Army of the
Potomac, 104), adding, with fine magnanimity,
that it is not necessary to impute any “really
unworthy motive” to Mr. Lincoln!
