and predictions of inimical friends, the foolish advice
of genuine supporters. It is now plain that all
the counsel which was given to him was bad, from whatsoever
quarter it came. It shows the powerfulness of
his nature that he retained his cool and accurate judgment,
although the crisis was such that even he also had
to admit that the danger of defeat was imminent.
To Mr. Raymond’s panic-stricken suggestions he
made a very shrewd response by drafting some instructions
for the purpose of sending that gentleman himself
on the mission to Mr. Davis. It was the same
tactics which he had pursued in dispatching Mr. Greeley
to meet the Southerners in Canada. The result
was that the fruitlessness of the suggestion was admitted
by its author.
As if all hurtful influences were to be concentrated
against the President, it became necessary just at
this inopportune time to make good the terrible waste
in the armies caused by expiration of terms of service
and by the bloody campaigns of Grant and Sherman.
Volunteering was substantially at an end, and a call
for troops would have to be enforced by a draft.
Inevitably this would stir afresh the hostility of
those who dreaded that the conscription might sweep
into military service themselves or those dear to
them. It was Mr. Lincoln’s duty, however,
to make the demand, and to make it at once. He
did so; regardless of personal consequences, he called
for 500,000 more men.
Thus in July and August the surface was covered with
straws, and every one of them indicated a current
setting strongly against Mr. Lincoln. Unexpectedly
the Democratic Convention made a small counter-eddy;
for the peace Democrats, led by Vallandigham, were
ill advised enough to force a peace plank into the
platform. This was at once repudiated by McClellan
in his letter of acceptance, and then again was reiterated
by Vallandigham as the true policy of the party.
Thus war Democrats were alarmed, and a split was opened.
Yet it was by no means such a chasm as that which,
upon the opposite side, divided the radicals and politicians
from the mass of their Republican comrades. It
might affect ratios, but did not seem likely to change
results. In a word, all political observers now
believed that military success was the only medicine
which could help the Republican prostration, and whether
this medicine could be procured was very doubtful.
FOOTNOTES:
[64] Arnold, Lincoln, 384, 385. Nicolay
and Hay seem to me to go too far in belittling the
opposition to Mr. Lincoln within the Republican party.
[65] See Arnold, Lincoln, 385. But the
fact is notorious among all who remember those times.
[66] Polit. Recoll. 243 et seq. Mr. Julian
here gives a vivid sketch of the opposition to Mr.
Lincoln.
[67] In the National Intelligencer, February
22, 1864.
[68] Lovejoy had generally stood faithfully by the
President.
