a struggle determined in favor of the national life,
may have carried him somewhat beyond the limitations
set by the hard facts of the case, and by the human
nature alike of the excited conquerors and the impenitent
conquered. On the other hand, however, it is dangerous
to say that Mr. Lincoln made a mistake in reading
the popular feeling or in determining a broad policy.
If he did, he did so for the first time. Among
those suppositions in which posterity is free to indulge,
it is possible to fancy that if he, whom all now admit
to have been the best friend of the South living in
April, 1865, had continued to live longer, he might
have alleviated, if he could not altogether have prevented,
the writing of some very painful chapters in the history
of the United States.
NOTE.—In writing this chapter, I have run
somewhat ahead of the narrative in point of time;
but I hope that the desirability of treating the topic
connectedly, as a whole, will be obvious to the reader.
[55] These appointments were as follows: Andrew
Johnson, Tennessee, February 23, 1862; Edward Stanley,
North Carolina, May 19, 1862; Col. G.F.
Shepley, Louisiana, June 10, 1862.
[56] So said Andrew Johnson, military governor of
Tennessee, March 18, 1862.
[57] In a contest in which emancipation was indirectly
at stake, in Maryland, he expressed his wish that
“all loyal qualified voters” should have
the privilege of voting.
[58] N. and H. ix. 120-122, quoting from the diary
of Mr. John Hay.
[59] He had used similar language in a letter to General
Canby, December 12, 1864; N. and H. ix. 448; also
in his letter to Trumbull concerning the Louisiana
senators, January 9, 1865; ibid. 454. Colonel
McClure, on the strength of conversations with Lincoln,
says that his single purpose was “the speedy
and cordial restoration of the dissevered States.
He cherished no resentment against the South, and every
theory of reconstruction that he ever conceived or
presented was eminently peaceful and looking solely
to reattaching the estranged people to the government.”
Lincoln and Men of War-Times, 223.
[60] Sherman, Memoirs, ii. 356.
[61] Grant stigmatizes this as “cruel and harsh
treatment ... unnecessarily ... inflicted,”
Mem. ii. 534, and as “infamous,”
Badeau, Milit. Hist. of Grant, iii. 636
n.
[62] Sherman, Memoirs, ii. 328. The admiral
says that, if Lincoln had lived, he “would have
shouldered all the responsibility” for Sherman’s
action, and Secretary Stanton would have “issued
no false telegraphic dispatches.” See also
Senator Sherman’s corroborative statement; McClure,
Lincoln and Men of War-Times, 219 n.
[63] Sherman, Memoirs, ii. 360.
RENOMINATION
