[164] McClellan afterward wrote that the administration
“had neither courage nor military insight to
understand the effect of the plan I desired to carry
out.” Own Story, 194. This is perhaps
a mild example of many remarks to the same purport
which fell from the general at one time and another.
[165] See remarks of Mr. Blaine, Twenty Years of
Congress, i. 368.
[166] E.g., McClellan, Rep. (per Keyes),
82; Grant, Mem. i. 322; and indeed all writers
agree upon this.
MILITARY MATTERS OUTSIDE OF VIRGINIA
The man who first raised the cry “On to Richmond!”
uttered the formula of the war. Richmond was
the gage of victory. Thus it happened, as has
been seen, that every one at the North, from the President
down, had his attention fast bound to the melancholy
procession of delays and miscarriages in Virginia.
At the West there were important things to be done;
the States of Kentucky, Tennessee, and Missouri, trembling
in the balance, were to be lost or won for the Union;
the passage down the Mississippi to the Gulf was at
stake, and with it the prosperity and development
of the boundless regions of the Northwest. Surely
these were interests of some moment, and worthy of
liberal expenditure of thought and energy, men and
money; yet the swarm of politicians gave them only
side glances, being unable for many minutes in any
day to withdraw their eyes from the Old Dominion.
The consequence was that at the East matters military
and matters political, generals and “public men”
of all varieties were mixed in a snarl of backbiting
and quarreling, which presented a spectacle most melancholy
and discouraging. On the other hand, the West
throve surprisingly well in the absence of political
nourishment, and certain local commanders achieved
cheering successes without any aid from the military
civilians of Washington. The contrast seems suggestive,
yet perhaps it is incorrect to attach to these facts
any sinister significance, or any connection of cause
and effect. Other reasons than civilian assistance
may account for the Virginia failures, while Western
successes may have been won in spite of neglect rather
than by reason of it. Still, simply as naked facts,
these things were so.
Upon occurrences outside of Virginia Mr. Lincoln bestowed
more thought than was fashionable in Washington, and
maintained an oversight strongly in contrast to the
indifference of those who seemed to recognize no other
duty than to discuss the demerits of General McClellan.
The President had at least the good sense to see the
value of unity of plan and cooeperation along the
whole line, from the Atlantic seaboard to the extreme
West. Also at the West as at the East he was bent
upon advancing, pressing the enemy, and doing something
positive. He had not occasion to use the spur
at the West either so often or so severely as at the
