[146] A reconnoissance or “slight demonstration”
ordered for the day before by McClellan had been completed,
and is not to be confounded with this movement, for
which he was not responsible.
[147] For example, see his Own Story, 82; but,
unfortunately, one may refer to that book passim
for evidence of the statement.
[148] N. and H. iv. 469.
[149] Ibid. v. 140.
[150] Letter to Lincoln, February 3, 1862.
[151] Army of Potomac, 97. Swinton says:
“He should have made the lightest possible draft
on the indulgence of the people.” Ibid.
69. General Webb says: “He drew too
heavily upon the faith of the public.” The
Peninsula, 12.
[152] The Southern generals had a similar propensity
to overestimate the opposing force; e.g., Johnston’s
Narrative, 108, where he puts the Northern
force at 140,000, when in fact it was 58,000; and on
p. 112 his statement is even worse.
[153] The Southerners also had the same notion, hoping
by one great victory to discourage and convince the
North and make peace on the basis of independence;
e.g., see Johnston’s Narrative
113, 115. Grant likewise had the notion of a
decisive battle. Memoirs, i. 368.
[154] The position taken by Messrs. Nicolay and Hay,
I think, fully warrants this language.
[155] General Palfrey says of this committee that
“the worst spirit of the Inquisition characterized
their doings.” The Antietam and Fredericksburg
(Campaigns of Civil War Series), 182.
[156] Through Stanton; McClellan, Own Story,
156.
[157] Only a few days before this time Lincoln had
said that he had no “right” to insist
upon knowing the general’s plans. Julian,
Polit. Recoll. 201.
[158] It appears that he feared that what he said
would leak out, and ultimately reach the enemy.
[159] For an interesting account of these incidents,
from Secretary Chase’s Diary, see Warden, 401.
[160] Lamon, 332; Herndon, 353-356; N. and H. try
to mitigate this story, v. 133.
[161] He did not always feel his tongue tied afterward
by the obligations of office; e.g., see Julian,
Polit. Recoll. 210.
[162] For a singular tale, see McClellan, Own Story,
153.
[163] In fact, the feeling against McClellan was getting
so strong that some of his enemies were wild enough
about this time to accuse him of disloyalty.
He himself narrates a dramatic tale, which would seem
incredible if his veracity were not beyond question,
of an interview, occurring March 8, 1862, in which
the President told him, apparently with the air of
expecting an explanation, that he was charged with
laying his plans with the traitorous intent of leaving
Washington defenseless. McClellan’s Own
Story, 195. On the other hand, McClellan
retaliated by believing that his detractors wished,
for political and personal motives, to prevent the
war from being brought to an early and successful
close, and that they intentionally withheld from him
the means of success; also that Stanton especially
sought by underhand means to sow misunderstanding
between him and the President. Ibid. 195.
