present with other things, if it is not intelligible according to another thing, but the intelligible is one certain thing in species; or it will have something mingled, which will make it to be intelligible in the same manner as other things.  Or shall we say that to suffer subsists according to something common?  On which account, it was before observed that intellect is in capacity, in a certain respect, intelligibles, but is no one of them in entelecheia, before it understands or perceives intellectually.  But it is necessary to conceive of it as of a table in which nothing is written in entelecheia; which happens to be the case in intellect.  But in those things which have matter, each of the intelligibles is in capacity only.  Hence, intellect will not be present with them; for the intellect of such things is capacity without matter.  But with intellect the intelligible will be present.

* * * * *

Since, however, in every nature there is something which is matter to each genus (and this because it is all those in capacity), and something which is the cause and affective, because it produces all things (in such a manner as art is affected with respect to matter), it is necessary that these differences should also be inherent in the soul.  And the one is an intellect of this kind because it becomes all things; but the other because it produces all things as a certain habit, such for instance as light.  For in a certain respect, light also causes colors which are in capacity to be colors in energy.  And this intellect is separate, unmingled, and impassive, since it is in its essence energy; for the efficient is always more honorable than the patient, and the principle than matter.  Science, also, in energy is the same as the thing [which is scientifically known].  But science which is in capacity is prior in time in the one [to science in energy]; though, in short, neither [is capacity prior to energy] in time.  It does not, however, perceive intellectually at one time and at another time not, but separate intellect is alone this very thing which it is; and this alone is immortal and eternal.  We do not, however, remember because this is impassive; but the passive intellect is corruptible, and without this the separate intellect understands nothing.

ON THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN HISTORY AND POETRY, AND HOW HISTORICAL MATTER SHOULD BE USED IN POETRY

From the ‘Poetics,’ Chapter 9

But it is evident from what has been said that it is not the province of a poet to relate things which have happened, but such as might have happened, and such things as are possible according to probability, or which would necessarily have happened.  For a historian and a poet do not differ from each other because the one writes in verse and the other in prose; for the history of Herodotus might be written in verse, and yet it would be no less a history with metre than