But coming to the other point—where a leading
citizen becomes the prince of his country, not by
wickedness or any intolerable violence, but by the
favour of his fellow citizens—this may be
called a civil principality: nor is genius or
fortune altogether necessary to attain to it, but
rather a happy shrewdness. I say then that such
a principality is obtained either by the favour of
the people or by the favour of the nobles. Because
in all cities these two distinct parties are found,
and from this it arises that the people do not wish
to be ruled nor oppressed by the nobles, and the nobles
wish to rule and oppress the people; and from these
two opposite desires there arises in cities one of
three results, either a principality, self-government,
or anarchy.
A principality is created either by the people or
by the nobles, accordingly as one or other of them
has the opportunity; for the nobles, seeing they cannot
withstand the people, begin to cry up the reputation
of one of themselves, and they make him a prince, so
that under his shadow they can give vent to their
ambitions. The people, finding they cannot resist
the nobles, also cry up the reputation of one of themselves,
and make him a prince so as to be defended by his authority.
He who obtains sovereignty by the assistance of the
nobles maintains himself with more difficulty than
he who comes to it by the aid of the people, because
the former finds himself with many around him who
consider themselves his equals, and because of this
he can neither rule nor manage them to his liking.
But he who reaches sovereignty by popular favour finds
himself alone, and has none around him, or few, who
are not prepared to obey him.
Besides this, one cannot by fair dealing, and without
injury to others, satisfy the nobles, but you can
satisfy the people, for their object is more righteous
than that of the nobles, the latter wishing to oppress,
while the former only desire not to be oppressed.
It is to be added also that a prince can never secure
himself against a hostile people, because of their
being too many, whilst from the nobles he can secure
himself, as they are few in number. The worst
that a prince may expect from a hostile people is
to be abandoned by them; but from hostile nobles he
has not only to fear abandonment, but also that they
will rise against him; for they, being in these affairs
more far-seeing and astute, always come forward in
time to save themselves, and to obtain favours from
him whom they expect to prevail. Further, the
prince is compelled to live always with the same people,
but he can do well without the same nobles, being
able to make and unmake them daily, and to give or
take away authority when it pleases him.
