The feminine gender is that which denotes persons or animals of the female kind; as, woman, mother, queen.

The neuter gender is that which denotes things that are neither male nor female; as, pen, ink, paper.

Hence, names of males are masculine; names of females, feminine; and names of things inanimate, literally, neuter.

Masculine nouns make regular feminines, when their termination is changed to ess:  as, hunter, huntress; prince, princess; lion, lioness.

OBSERVATIONS.

OBS. 1.—­The different genders in grammar are founded on the natural distinction of sex in animals, and on the absence of sex in other things.  In English, they belong only to nouns and pronouns; and to these they are usually applied, not arbitrarily, as in some other languages, but agreeably to the order of nature.  From this we derive a very striking advantage over those who use the gender differently, or without such rule; which is, that our pronouns are easy of application, and have a fine effect when objects are personified.  Pronouns are of the same gender as the nouns for which they stand.

OBS. 2.—­Many nouns are equally applicable to both sexes; as, cousin, friend, neighbour, parent, person, servant.  The gender of these is usually determined by the context; and they are to be called masculine or feminine accordingly.  To such words, some grammarians have applied the unnecessary and improper term common gender.  Murray justly observes, “There is no such gender belonging to the language.  The business of parsing can be effectually performed, without having recourse to a common gender.”—­Gram., 8vo. p. 39.  The term is more useful, and less liable to objection, as applied to the learned languages; but with us, whose genders distinguish objects in regard to sex, it is plainly a solecism.

OBS. 3.—­A great many of our grammars define gender to be “the distinction of sex,” and then speak of a common gender, in which the two sexes are left undistinguished; and of the neuter gender, in which objects are treated as being of neither sex.  These views of the matter are obviously inconsistent.  Not genders, or a gender, do the writers undertake to define, but “gender” as a whole; and absurdly enough, too; because this whole of gender they immediately distribute into certain other genders, into genders of gender, or kinds of gender, and these not compatible with their definition.  Thus Wells:  “Gender is the distinction of objects, with regard to sex.  There are four genders;—­the masculine, the feminine, the common, and the neuter.”—­School Gram., 1st Ed., p. 49. [Those] “Nouns which are applicable alike to both sexes, are of the common gender.”—­Ib. This then is manifestly no gender under the foregoing