and wishes to keep them as they are.  A man like Godwin believes existence to be kindly; but he is a rebel.  A man like Carlyle believes existence to be cruel; but he is a Tory.  Everywhere the man who alters things begins by liking things.  And the real explanation of this success of the optimistic reformer, of this failure of the pessimistic reformer, is, after all, an explanation of sufficient simplicity.  It is because the optimist can look at wrong not only with indignation, but with a startled indignation.  When the pessimist looks at any infamy, it is to him, after all, only a repetition of the infamy of existence.  The Court of Chancery is indefensible—­like mankind.  The Inquisition is abominable—­like the universe.  But the optimist sees injustice as something discordant and unexpected, and it stings him into action.  The pessimist can be enraged at wrong; but only the optimist can be surprised at it.

And it is the same with the relations of an anomaly to the logical mind.  The pessimist resents evil (like Lord Macaulay) solely because it is a grievance.  The optimist resents it also, because it is an anomaly; a contradiction to his conception of the course of things.  And it is not at all unimportant, but on the contrary most important, that this course of things in politics and elsewhere should be lucid, explicable and defensible.  When people have got used to unreason they can no longer be startled at injustice.  When people have grown familiar with an anomaly, they are prepared to that extent for a grievance; they may think the grievance grievous, but they can no longer think it strange.  Take, if only as an excellent example, the very matter alluded to before; I mean the seats, or rather the lack of seats, in the House of Commons.  Perhaps it is true that under the best conditions it would never happen that every member turned up.  Perhaps a complete attendance would never actually be.  But who can tell how much influence in keeping members away may have been exerted by this calm assumption that they would stop away?  How can any man be expected to help to make a full attendance when he knows that a full attendance is actually forbidden?  How can the men who make up the Chamber do their duty reasonably when the very men who built the House have not done theirs reasonably?  If the trumpet give an uncertain sound, who shall prepare himself for the battle?  And what if the remarks of the trumpet take this form, “I charge you as you love your King and country to come to this Council.  And I know you won’t.”

CONCEIT AND CARICATURE