unless one person’s happiness, supposed equal
in degree (with the proper allowance made for kind),
is counted for exactly as much as another’s.
Those conditions being supplied, Bentham’s dictum,
’everybody to count for one, nobody for more
than one,’ might be written under the principle
of utility as an explanatory commentary.[D] The equal
claim of everybody to happiness in the estimation
of the moralist and the legislator, involves an equal
claim to all the means of happiness, except in so
far as the inevitable conditions of human life, and
the general interest, in which that of every individual
is included, set limits to the maxim; and those limits
ought to be strictly construed. As every other
maxim of justice, so this, is by no means applied
or held applicable universally; on the contrary, as
I have already remarked, it bends to every person’s
ideas of social expediency. But in whatever case
it is deemed applicable at all, it is held to be the
dictate of justice. All persons are deemed to
have a
right to equality of treatment, except
when some recognised social expediency requires the
reverse. And hence all social inequalities which
have ceased to be considered expedient, assume the
character not of simple inexpediency, but of injustice,
and appear so tyrannical, that people are apt to wonder
how they ever could have been tolerated; forgetful
that they themselves perhaps tolerate other inequalities
under an equally mistaken notion of expediency, the
correction of which would make that which they approve
seem quite as monstrous as what they have at last
learnt to condemn. The entire history of social
improvement has been a series of transitions, by which
one custom or institution after another, from being
a supposed primary necessity of social existence,
has passed into the rank of an universally stigmatized
injustice and tyranny. So it has been with the
distinctions of slaves and freemen, nobles and serfs,
patricians and plebeians; and so it will be, and in
part already is, with the aristocracies of colour,
race, and sex.
It appears from what has been said, that justice is
a name for certain moral requirements, which, regarded
collectively, stand higher in the scale of social
utility, and are therefore of more paramount obligation,
than any others; though particular cases may occur
in which some other social duty is so important, as
to overrule any one of the general maxims of justice.
Thus, to save a life, it may not only be allowable,
but a duty, to steal, or take by force, the necessary
food or medicine, or to kidnap, and compel to officiate,
the only qualified medical practitioner. In such
cases, as we do not call anything justice which is
not a virtue, we usually say, not that justice must
give way to some other moral principle, but that what
is just in ordinary cases is, by reason of that other
principle, not just in the particular case. By
this useful accommodation of language, the character
of indefeasibility attributed to justice is kept up,
and we are saved from the necessity of maintaining
that there can be laudable injustice.