Such were the swift and brilliant results of General
Lyautey’s intervention. The first difficulties
had been quickly overcome; others, far more complicated,
remained. The military occupation of Morocco had
to be followed up by its civil reorganization.
By the Franco-German treaty of 1911 Germany had finally
agreed to recognize the French protectorate in Morocco;
but in spite of an apparently explicit acknowledgment
of this right, Germany, as usual, managed to slip into
the contract certain ambiguities of form that were
likely to lead to future trouble.
To obtain even this incomplete treaty France had had
to sacrifice part of her colonies in equatorial Africa;
and in addition to the uncertain relation with Germany
there remained the dead weight of the Spanish zone
and the confused international administration of Tangier.
The disastrously misgoverned Spanish zone has always
been a centre for German intrigue and native conspiracies,
as well as a permanent obstacle to the economic development
of Morocco.
Such were the problems that General Lyautey found
awaiting him. A long colonial experience, and
an unusual combination of military and administrative
talents, prepared him for the almost impossible task
of dealing with them. Swift and decisive when
military action is required, he has above all the
long views and endless patience necessary to the successful
colonial governor. The policy of France in Morocco
had been weak and spasmodic; in his hands it became
firm and consecutive. A sympathetic understanding
of the native prejudices, and a real affection for
the native character, made him try to build up an administration
which should be, not an application of French ideas
to African conditions, but a development of the best
native aspirations. The difficulties were immense.
The attempt to govern as far as possible through the
Great Chiefs was a wise one, but it was hampered by
the fact that these powerful leaders, however loyal
to the Protectorate, knew no methods of administration
but those based on extortion. It was necessary
at once to use them and to educate them; and one of
General Lyautey’s greatest achievements has
been the successful employment of native ability in
the government of the country.
II
The first thing to do was to create a strong frontier
against the dissident tribes of the Blad-es-Siba.
To do this it was necessary that the French should
hold the natural defenses of the country, the foothills
of the Little and of the Great Atlas, and the valley
of the Moulouya, which forms the corridor between
western Algeria and Morocco. This was nearly
accomplished in 1914 when war broke out.
At that moment the home government cabled the Resident-General
to send all his available troops to France, abandoning
the whole of conquered territory except the coast
towns. To do so would have been to give France’s
richest colonies[A] outright to Germany at a moment
when what they could supply—meat and wheat—was
exactly what the enemy most needed.
