At 11 A.M. on November 18 I was officially informed that the Council of Ministers had met at 9 A.M., and were now in session, having met to consider the situation produced by the arrest of the Directorate.  They had already asked Admiral Koltchak to accept supreme authority, that he had refused, but the Ministers had great hope that for the sake of Russia the admiral could be prevailed upon to take the burden of Government upon himself, as it appeared to be the only means of getting the country out of her desperate situation.  The wildest rumours were in circulation:  that my carriage would be attacked by bombs, that the British would at any time be obliged to fight for their lives.  I told my informants that they need not worry about us; we were well able to take care of ourselves.  They could not understand our indifference.  The fact was that not a man or officer in my battalion had the slightest inkling of the position.  Then the tune changed.  Would I defend the Ministers who were still in session if they were attacked?  My answer was that any political refugee who sought asylum in my lines would be protected, but he must give up every idea of again taking any part in Russian affairs.  “But what would you do if the Russian troops revolted and sought to murder those who had come into your lines.  Would you give them up?” “Never!” “What if the Czech commanders made the demand?” “Still never; besides which the Czechs are too honourable ever to make a demand such as no soldier could accept.”  The last question was the most important of all, and was doubtless the kernel of the whole series, the others being mere camouflage.

The Czechs had just inaugurated their National Republican Government, and were naturally obsessed with the usual “Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity” business, and could not be expected to view the establishment of a Dictatorship within their sphere of operations with entire unconcern or without serious misgivings.  The hostile attitude of the Russian branch of their National Council at Ekaterinburg and Chilliyabinsk, directly they heard of Koltchak’s acceptance of the supreme authority, is proof of the danger which might evolve from that quarter.

The Council of Ministers, and perhaps Koltchak himself, were unable to take the final plunge until they had a thorough understanding of the British attitude.  The position of the Czech forces at Omsk made it impossible for them to approach the place where the Ministers were in session without passing the British, and my machine guns commanded every avenue leading to or from the Russian Headquarters.

Things were now in such a state of tension that for the safety of my command I informed both the Russian and Czech authorities that I should not allow bodies of troops or citizens either to approach or collect near my cantonment; that such approach or collection would be treated as hostile, and dealt with accordingly.  That these arrangements gave the Ministers greater confidence to proceed with their policy I have no doubt.  That was one of the inevitable consequences of the preparations for our own defence, but not the inspiration of their policy, which was entirely their own; but it did steady the situation.