Why We Are at War (2nd Edition, revised) eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 254 pages of information about Why We Are at War (2nd Edition, revised).

Why We Are at War (2nd Edition, revised) eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 254 pages of information about Why We Are at War (2nd Edition, revised).

EXHIBIT 15.

Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador in London on July 27th, 1914.

We have at once started the mediation proposal in Vienna in the sense as desired by Sir Edward Grey.  We have communicated besides to Count Berchtold the desire of M. Sasonow for a direct parley with Vienna.

EXHIBIT 16.

Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at Vienna to the Chancellor on July 28th, 1914.

Count Berchtold requests me to express to Your Excellency his thanks for the communication of the English mediation proposal.  He states, however, that after the opening of hostilities by Servia and the subsequent declaration of war, the step appears belated.

EXHIBIT 17.

Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at Paris on July 29th, 1914.

News received here regarding French preparations of war multiplies from hour to hour.  I request that You call the attention of the French Government to this and accentuate that such measures would call forth counter-measures on our part.  We should have to proclaim threatening state of war (drohende Kriegsgefahr), and while this would not mean a call for the reserves or mobilization, yet the tension would be aggravated.  We continue to hope for the preservation of peace.

EXHIBIT 18.

Telegram of the Military Attache at St. Petersburg to H. M. the Kaiser on July 30th, 1914.

Prince Troubetzki said to me yesterday, after causing Your Majesty’s telegram to be delivered at once to Czar Nicolas:  Thank God that a telegram of Your Emperor has come.  He has just told me the telegram has made a deep impression upon the Czar but as the mobilization against Austria had already been ordered and Sasonow had convinced His Majesty that it was no longer possible to retreat, His Majesty was sorry he could not change it any more.  I then told him that the guilt for the measureless consequences lay at the door of premature mobilization against Austria-Hungary which after all was involved merely in a local war with Servia, for Germany’s answer was clear and the responsibility rested upon Russia which ignored Austria-Hungary’s assurance that it had no intentions of territorial gain in Servia.  Austria-Hungary mobilized against Servia and not against Russia and there was no ground for an immediate action on the part of Russia.  I further added that in Germany one could not understand any more Russia’s phrase that “she could not desert her brethren in Servia”, after the horrible crime of Sarajevo.  I told him finally he need not wonder if Germany’s army were to be mobilized.

EXHIBIT 19.

Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at Rome on July 31st, 1914.

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Why We Are at War (2nd Edition, revised) from Project Gutenberg. Public domain.