Why We Are at War (2nd Edition, revised) eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 254 pages of information about Why We Are at War (2nd Edition, revised).

Why We Are at War (2nd Edition, revised) eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 254 pages of information about Why We Are at War (2nd Edition, revised).

This important collection of documents, which has only reached us since the publication of our first edition, confirms the conclusion, which we had deduced from other evidence in our fifth chapter (supra, pp. 66-107), that Germany consistently placed obstacles in the way of any proposals for a peaceful settlement, and this in spite of the willingness of all the other Powers, including Austria-Hungary and Russia, to continue discussion of the Servian question.  That the crisis took Russia by surprise seems evident from the fact that her ambassadors accredited to France, Berlin, and Vienna were not at their posts when friction began with Russia. (Infra, Nos. 4, 7, 8.)

The Russian evidence shows that, on July 29, Germany threatened to mobilize if Russia did not desist from military preparations.  This threat was viewed by M. Sazonof as an additional reason for taking all precautions; ’since we cannot accede to Germany’s desire, the only course open to us is to accelerate our own preparations and to assume that war is probably inevitable.’ (Infra, No. 58.) The reader will also notice the curious fact that on July 30 the decree mobilizing the German army and navy was published, only to be immediately withdrawn; and that the German Government explained that the publication had been premature and accidental. (Infra, Nos. 61, 62.) We know from the British White Book (Correspondence, No. 99, Sir F. Bertie to Sir E. Grey, July 30) that, on July 30, Germany showed signs of weakening in her attitude to Russia.

It will be noted that war between Austria-Hungary and Russia was not officially declared until August 6, five days after Germany had declared war on Russia. (Infra, No. 79.)

In Nos. 36 and 46 will be found some curious details of the methods employed by Austria-Hungary and Germany to delay the publication of the Servian reply to Austria-Hungary.

MINISTERE DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES.

RECUEIL

DE DOCUMENTS DIPLOMATIQUES.

Negociations ayant precede la guerre.

10/23 Juillet—­24 Juillet/6 Aout 1914.

Petrograde,
Imprimerie de l’Etat.
1914.

No. 1.

Le Charge d’affaires en Serbie au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres.

(Telegramme).

Belgrade, le 10/23 Juillet 1914.

Le Ministre d’Autriche vient de transmettre, a 6 heures du soir, an Ministre des Finances Patchou, qui remplace Pachitch, une note ultimative de son Gouvernement fixant un delai de 48 heures pour l’acceptation des demandes y contenues.  Giesl a ajoute verbalement que pour le cas ou la note ne serait pas acceptee integralement dans un delai de 48 heures, il avait l’ordre de quitter Belgrade avec le personnel de la Legation.  Pachitch et les autres Ministres qui se trouvent en tournee electorale ont ete rappeles et sont attendus a Belgrade demain Vendredi a 10 heures du matin.  Patchou qui m’a communique le contenu de la note, sollicite l’aide de la Russie et declare qu’aucun Gouvernement Serbe ne pourra accepter les demandes de l’Autriche.

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Why We Are at War (2nd Edition, revised) from Project Gutenberg. Public domain.