Sea-Power and Other Studies eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 277 pages of information about Sea-Power and Other Studies.

Sea-Power and Other Studies eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 277 pages of information about Sea-Power and Other Studies.
was moderate in proportion to his numbers.  In the following May Mischenko made another raid, this time round General Nogi’s flank.  He had with him fifty squadrons, a horse artillery battery, and a battery of machine guns.  Starting on the 17th, he was discovered on the 18th, came in contact with his enemy on the 19th, but met with no considerable hostile force till the 20th, when the Japanese cavalry arrived just in time to collide with the Russian rearguard of two squadrons.  On this General Mischenko ’retired at his ease for some thirty miles along the Japanese flank and perhaps fifteen miles away from it.’  These Russians’ raids did not alter the course of the war nor bring ultimate victory to their standards.

It would be considered by every military authority as a flagrant absurdity to deduce from the history of these many raids on land that a strong army is not a sufficient defence for a continental country against invasion.  What other efficient defence against that can a continental country have?  Apply the reasoning to the case of an insular country, and reliance on naval defence will be abundantly justified.

To maintain that Canada, India, and Egypt respectively could be invaded by the United States, Russia, and Turkey, backed by Germany, notwithstanding any action that our navy could take, would be equivalent to maintaining that one part of our empire cannot or need not reinforce another.  Suppose that we had a military force numerically equal to or exceeding the Russian, how could any of it be sent to defend Canada, India, and Egypt, or to reinforce the defenders of those countries, unless our sea communications were kept open?  Can these be kept open except by the action of our navy?  It is plain that they cannot.

VIII

QUEEN ELIZABETH AND HER SEAMEN[65]

[Footnote 65:  Written in 1900. (NineteenthCentury_and_After_, 1901.)]

An eminent writer has recently repeated the accusations made within the last forty years, and apparently only within that period, against Queen Elizabeth of having starved the seamen of her fleet by giving them food insufficient in quantity and bad in quality, and of having robbed them by keeping them out of the pay due to them.  He also accuses the Queen, though somewhat less plainly, of having deliberately acquiesced in a wholesale slaughter of her seamen by remaining still, though no adequate provision had been made for the care of the sick and wounded.  There are further charges of obstinately objecting, out of mere stinginess, to take proper measures for the naval defence of the country, and of withholding a sufficient supply of ammunition from her ships when about to meet the enemy.  Lest it should be supposed that this is an exaggerated statement of the case against Elizabeth as formulated by the writer in question, his own words are given.

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Sea-Power and Other Studies from Project Gutenberg. Public domain.